Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e79cbe266df0e4a6…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

212.4 KB Created: 2022-05-22 17:10:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 15.0000 First seen: 2022-05-24
MD5: 5a0187dff6fcc8149b2e9d01e20179fa SHA-1: 143ad92b2253eb5f23fa22d320844510f5c02834 SHA-256: e79cbe266df0e4a6a72b6be67d0d0d4dc276ee4559c627a3dfd73dd1859af7f5
82 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic

The critical heuristic indicates an embedded OOXML object containing a VBA macro. This macro is designed to download a second-stage payload from the URL 'https://www.mediafire.com/file/87j3bj0ks0asu58/3.htm/file'. The presence of this embedded macro and the external download URL strongly suggests a malicious document intended to deliver further malware.

Heuristics 3

  • Embedded Office object carries macros critical OFFICE_EMBEDDED_MACRO_OBJECT
    This document embeds a second Office file that itself contains a VBA macro project or an Excel 4.0 (XLM) macro sheet. Hiding a macro-bearing workbook or document inside another document — frequently under an obfuscated, non-standard part name — is a macro-smuggling technique that defeats scanners which only inspect the outer document's macro storage. No benign authoring workflow stages a hidden macro project this way.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://www.mediafire.com/file/87j3bj0ks0asu58/3.htm/file
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
50cb09481894db2f5a1d3c7205f089f51a43e30660a9f0fe607362736ca63eac		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/!!!~!!!!~~~!!!!3.!!!~~~~!!!! 14466 bytes

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