Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e7829c6b2b82fc51…

MALICIOUS

PDF

83.1 KB Created: 2021-09-01 02:52:25 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-05
MD5: f20cec2f20ae793e519f702489cfe9e8 SHA-1: adfd121e606a304f836373fb7de4004de55bf0cf SHA-256: e7829c6b2b82fc518922138374694b83518e2dec268d77bb8cf04c6fccd8660b
256 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

The sample is a PDF document that uses a social engineering lure to trick the user into installing a fake browser update or extension. Multiple heuristics indicate the presence of external links, including those pointing to potentially compromised websites and IP addresses, suggesting a download or redirection mechanism. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely related to phishing or malware delivery.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9983

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Browser extension / update installation lure high SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE
    Document tells the user to install a browser extension, plugin, viewer, or browser update to view content — a common social-engineering path for credential theft and malware installation
  • Clickable URI points to raw IP address medium PDF_URI_IP_LITERAL
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose host is a literal IPv4 address. Legitimate documents normally link to named domains; raw-IP destinations are common in disposable phishing and malware-delivery infrastructure.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://synerhu.ru/uplcv?utm_term=html+and+css+code PDF link annotation
    • http://karmand24.ir/basefile/ehotel724ir/files/bogime.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://uran-berlin.com/userfiles/file/23835116297.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kes-stv.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/052d744ba322b0ef6fb682b3f701a5b2/busabujasopinimilewolu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.americanapi.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a7f41325d17---zimubatedodedin.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://jadeite.ru/images/file/savapadota.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://thewesternmist.com/userfiles/file/wepatebaromabuxe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.mysmilestudios.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/9cee0a2a6fbd8837c8aa2d805d8ee042/53268307694.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lucidarepavimentimarmogenovaealessandria.it/userfiles/files/99832751950.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://140.121.180.103/ckfinder/userfiles/files/6031720274.pdfPDF link annotation
    • http://www.julitolaschools.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160721790bf8cb---fexememijidiruzolalovaxi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://aryaayur.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16113f009a4394---63294070522.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.quatainvestimentos.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160e5dcf0e50fd---furovuzudo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://qualitylightsolutions.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/71375197b440b20ab9364cbe2e4f75f1/tejokujakovirizidusuj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://newat.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/35da89ace56fa53241595ba671e2b0e2/42233648194.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ontsgoi.shop/uploads/files/21649907899.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://directprocessors.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160de1d7eb4d84---36561135688.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://logopeda-empatia.pl/content/file/vusise.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://santehsevast.ru/userfiles/files/83165192223.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://maasmartcity.com/userfiles/file/lokamefugugareda.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://abe-rdc.com/userfiles/file/jutejogejus.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://scandirent-new.ru/uploads/assets/file/zenusajexaro.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sonsuadogo.org/Images_upload/files/35321320065.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sckprime.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/02e4f532b24cbf540999a0d6f1ed941f/nazetoramunotoz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bruningfoundation.com/clients/9/99/99acc79c432c4c389b364f5b25189af3/File/dojopak.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e21b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE21B 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off0000fa2d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFA2D 17456 bytes
SHA-256: 835e23b89cc4133fd4db03010b2d52503873b6153eccecfd4bf613b4448ff81c
font_02_sfnt_off0001276c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1276C 10328 bytes
SHA-256: abdaf8b9459891def64e59e05a94a3f310344fe74f70e9d70badb45758b8bad1

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