Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e7810563618538c5…

MALICIOUS

PDF

80.5 KB Created: 2021-05-14 06:05:57 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 799e1d3e7ebc05706210e8e68a0e9803 SHA-1: 6865f8530bbde5f0891d507112c74cbf699c3c57 SHA-256: e7810563618538c5f6b69101de9948b15d61551bd6d6f6be1ba68d302cc370ff
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many of which point to disposable domains and are likely part of a link farm designed to host malicious content or phishing pages. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and heuristic firings suggest it's designed to exploit users by redirecting them to potentially harmful websites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9993

Heuristics 6

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://mezovuduw.ru/strik?utm_term=jbl+lsr305+professional+studio+monitor+price
    • http://medgaj.com/27917047175kkqu1.pdf
    • https://dixuxizexejo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740209/posatopogexifubodito.pdf
    • http://zezasarasojid.mywebcommunity.org/oriflame_catalogue_oct_2020.pdf
    • http://bluebadgeapproval.com/karodoqfntg.pdf
    • https://subilitukufune.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134629352/4808056.pdf
    • https://nidimikijugura.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134710695/9822122.pdf
    • https://jumuwubugunitus.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070493/ca1c66.pdf
    • http://about-central.com/75313527200lulb7.pdf
    • http://tapodozinojet.mypressonline.com/58824942742.pdf
    • https://duxataravur.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134017775/dojit.pdf
    • http://gmetry.online/36946444472uyosq.pdf
    • https://kedixusivazusug.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134869684/mezunoxij-gonamozufulawel.pdf
    • https://miperodijazef.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134308013/25c8c4e81e39c90.pdf
    • https://safamitiwifiro.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739579/jotujunesaba.pdf
    • http://jajolamuseku.medianewsonline.com/breviario_del_caos.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/salosibejodod/37571233870.pdf
    • https://755d026c-fd58-4633-9ca9-8af24261f473.filesusr.com/ugd/4622eb_544b67078adb40fa8fb86c1f639ad1c4.pdf?index=true
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/ritoma/vizio_d43-c1_remote.pdf
    • https://8b5ac0f3-2bc4-49a6-9a99-2541af31b215.filesusr.com/ugd/f2ef67_9772860df5d940ce9c3d15f0ec9f1e97.pdf?index=true
    • https://229c3593-bb94-4e5d-9b9f-ca3747df48ef.filesusr.com/ugd/145364_381982af9e294d9db7e022fe9c891466.pdf?index=true
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/radubozufiwo/91260014175.pdf
    • http://jubogaju.atwebpages.com/fuwez.pdf
    • https://9a89a7da-ede3-42eb-a537-7416be21eb2d.filesusr.com/ugd/aaaf79_e168031c124c4935aafc7052017669aa.pdf?index=true
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000fcde.bin
3a16be5fc5cac94e6340e0d42d88b0d63d3bf466d54da6b71daaacd9dea58b0b		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFCDE 5860 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000110b2.bin
276e0f26df1be6ae5a8aca38c1995c64675b10b723947c08366d0404b83bdc1b		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x110B2 10472 bytes

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