Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e76fb9e50484249d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

77.5 KB Created: 2021-03-31 06:54:16 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2026-06-04
MD5: 6e2efe815f4b0b116990bb2291f90fc3 SHA-1: e49d4e0f863d1f7ffc8b84f4f0c1e13a7d4b8cea SHA-256: e76fb9e50484249d9f2b8889fad685e5718633ce90fda3e5cc05a66cbc421246
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains numerous embedded links, with a critical heuristic identifying a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded links suggest a phishing or redirection attack, likely aiming to deliver further malware or lead users to fraudulent content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9996

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://dafemum.ru/strik?utm_term=can+you+ever+heal+from+childhood+trauma In PDF document text
    • http://tiwimifozukimu.medianewsonline.com/65641548099.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/gubogezemazo/ehcFAfT/balega_hidden_comfort_socks_reviews.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wegonugu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134040733/kaxuxedixin-tajuzejoz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/pofilese/hpgdkgi/can_anyone_learn_to_sing_opera.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/gogoxowiniza/46306698437.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://daxasukivebo.22web.org/lukegakonebojijuxuxev.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/wivunonovef/50006128830.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://noserosajegupa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453720/a02908fde82e51.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xekelubapakam.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134499273/d589c931a1.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/luropi/carmella_theme_song.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/denalivek/hjhVHjW/download_aplikasi_demolition_derby_3_mod_apk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dejepuzalew.mygamesonline.org/what_is_the_definition_of_great_depression.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/viwedanej/dVr3GLp/10649934516.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kasababafaraw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135336348/9516675.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/feluxolid/5aIYMhi/vowumiruselewumepub.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://wikukodukoja.onlinewebshop.net/terapia_barras_de_access.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://suwuriru.onlinewebshop.net/contract_agreement_format_for_construction.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://biwaborobow.rf.gd/xepopafutivefabeba.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dafolilujoxupan.rf.gd/bearing_types_and_application.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dijejewilibafux.onlinewebshop.net/62988053509.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bafuwujix.atwebpages.com/estrategias_de_comprension_lectora.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kokibitumoxa.epizy.com/23801710753.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Related samples 5

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f37b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF37B 5148 bytes
SHA-256: 08d76d017d59267eb79b0ae0dbb28b496c01a29ea317fcac317ac1d91d4cef94
font_01_sfnt_off000104e0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x104E0 10436 bytes
SHA-256: 1116326b863527d3410b6c9ea37c36809a8eb7fdb796cb18a11f53b4af1eece8

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