Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e75ab8390cb96a04…

MALICIOUS

PDF

72.6 KB Created: 2021-09-15 16:48:01 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: c33bab87bf0ce8c70505347584043920 SHA-1: 83c6328f20b7362fad920884491f65eae57c4bf6 SHA-256: e75ab8390cb96a04c0e014acaa923fcc08c81e28a34ea0bd4e39c23ea1746776
204 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF file contains embedded JavaScript and numerous external URIs, many of which point to compromised CMS uploads or disposable hosting, indicating a link farm designed to redirect users to potentially malicious content. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent, likely related to phishing or malware distribution. The embedded JavaScript is a common method for initiating further malicious actions.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9970

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://oniceh.ru/uplcv?utm_term=what+is+auto+sync+data+mean
    • https://unicon-msk.ru/data/files/jarekizukis.pdf
    • https://oasis-travel.ro/files/96946962514.pdf
    • http://ourgans.org/userfiles/files/xowekibo.pdf
    • http://www.psstrecno.sk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1612f5b0104300---nabiposuzudijugasediz.pdf
    • http://bhhangkhong.com/upload/images/files/pajorojixovinunatetitiso.pdf
    • http://thumpamonpally.com/userfiles/file/35407595719.pdf
    • http://burchiellati.com/file_fck/file/juguwupozewudeza.pdf
    • https://braindevelopmentmaps.org/userfiles/files/fatarat.pdf
    • http://nassagroup.org/app/webroot/js/ckfinder/userfiles/files/tesasuvemerikikomojik.pdf
    • http://adanateknikservis.web.tr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613f861893205---subesidetineloxa.pdf
    • http://midesignvn.com/uploads/files/waxoba.pdf
    • https://heuresromantiques.com/upload/files/86052418662.pdf
    • http://studiotecnicolamanna.com/userfiles/files/96180021854.pdf
    • https://jbdclothiers.net/emailer/userfiles/file/8005632825.pdf
    • http://allgeology.ru/ckfinder/userfiles/files/nunolemavonirakabase.pdf
    • https://arihantgranites.in/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/058e0c2ca3b018186c1426f35ea5bc9c/befuvek.pdf
    • https://anakaygame.net/calisma2/files/uploads/vuxasori.pdf
    • https://www.pharmawell.eu/ckfinder/userfiles/files/nexuzozutogivufe.pdf
    • http://yokohama-model.com/userfiles/files/ketupofisurojasiduwo.pdf
    • http://secretlove.ch/ckfinder/userfiles/files/16848562557.pdf
    • http://constructionone.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16140811c6f2fa---12415972821.pdf
    • https://ichibaninfotech.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/buramezitibozejix.pdf
    • http://seednseed.com/admin/fckfiles/file/vasoledizow.pdf
    • https://toptenstudy.com/upload/files/BodyFile__612FBEF73DE88.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ba89.bin
087354e9c40f3d52b82b4c6b424cf71fe510000fcc407328b23c36e38c18f136		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xBA89 10696 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000d301.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD301 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000eb13.bin
32512e474b9b044f1d6e2db67361f8f998942e273a9b6e163023f4b299195f6b		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEB13 16360 bytes

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