Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e758d15b2a6c7811…

MALICIOUS

PDF

77.2 KB Created: 2021-03-03 15:14:50 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-15
MD5: 9a537ce292251bb86da19bb624e7711b SHA-1: dc03a482614e900d62e3087eaf80f96ecf25d167 SHA-256: e758d15b2a6c781141c356fceca9c4defc0e9ed7882a2d355e016edd4c722c2a
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm or SEO spamming operation. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly indicate malicious intent, likely phishing or malware distribution. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and numerous external URIs suggest it's designed to redirect users to malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://fokemale.ru/strik?utm_term=harry+potter+book+5+chapter+31 PDF link annotation
    • https://koneligave.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134581264/nexaluwevevimesam.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xakediripikevul.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134338645/xuwij-karod-nofoponupinabin.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jazemajotejavux.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681398/kumolivamema.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://medupaj.iblogger.org/nibonozudebimoke.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://givodevivunafa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871579/tepetugosob.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://coolmag.biz/waxederenedezito9owyh.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://muzufuwuvul.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/3/132302955/5d2e9241.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://babapijolirex.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131409508/kefivotolexezuv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kenoduzuran.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135350653/buzegugan.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xujukega.66ghz.com/sasipuxemakotavokugin.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/pisedij/dejukar.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/lupebesu/25038561934.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/labitajaxatufib/email_formal_espaol_despedida.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wedofisirix.epizy.com/android_hamburger_menu_icon.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kojajopi.epizy.com/munufura.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zevizajezu.epizy.com/sample_leave_request_form_template.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f30b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF30B 5416 bytes
SHA-256: 9f89314cc3cebf1614c084112353fb47c42e2d2c26c751b661174b5409141f6e
font_01_sfnt_off00010581.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10581 10056 bytes
SHA-256: 3dc87f7ade36dc8a022da7c4e9a49de4349c65db1c9ed8d0d050ae648e63cc14

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