Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e74b6971889bbeb6…

MALICIOUS

PDF

295.0 KB Created: º¾ðª“gN¡sʎÔà< Authoring application: «Cø²ûtÌ,åb¯ùªóf®èGL (via ‰Xûîï^×,ð-ŽÐ’ýT 9 ø)
MD5: 6f8a31dfefab2ba3112f9bbc9ff44d67 SHA-1: a7d49eb7608d891756b0e4d0f0e22dac062f4eeb SHA-256: e74b6971889bbeb6a73d00514b86b2a06c9278b9d4d8e84cfe7e25ab0677388d
114 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF file is encrypted and contains JavaScript, indicating an attempt to obscure malicious content. The presence of CCITTFaxDecode related heuristics suggests exploitation of CVE-2010-0188 or a similar vulnerability. The document also contains elements of a fake invoice lure, commonly used to trick users into opening malicious attachments or clicking on links.

Heuristics 7

  • CCITTFaxDecode + active content — LibTIFF CVE-family indicator high CVE related PDF_CCITT_CVE_2010_0188_RELATED
    PDF uses /CCITTFaxDecode together with JavaScript, XFA, or RichMedia indicators. This matches the delivery pattern for Adobe Reader LibTIFF/CCITTFax parser exploit families, including CVE-2010-0188, but does not prove the exact malformed TIFF primitive.
  • Encrypted PDF carries /JavaScript — payload hidden from static analysis high PDF_ENCRYPTED_WITH_JS
    PDF declares /Encrypt and also references an executable trigger (/JavaScript). Document encryption hides the JavaScript body and stream contents from static scanners — combined with auto-execution indicators this is a known evasion pattern used to deliver weaponised JavaScript that the analyst cannot inspect without the decryption key.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTON
    PDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 2 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.

Extracted artifacts 32

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj1111_000.js
1777cf13a85b11e8ea1dbec93e0dfcfb487bea92444fcb58d3e7f25f416306d5
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1111 at offset 0x1B398 92 bytes
javascript_obj1114_003.js
886a64afd1d7b5b8b0e9dec799eee508bb80bfd404f0cb86bf3a2f2ebea835f1
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1114 at offset 0x1B487 64 bytes
javascript_obj1126_007.js
ffc03e446e7ff2140dfb3a17202bbc38c7b081c3a301d27bd6cc18603206e1cc
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1126 at offset 0x1B73E 56 bytes
javascript_obj1138_019.js
4809789553ac2bb77bd50f62bf093c07c07a0bdc2b7c71bbc1e8e0f38d33010e
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1138 at offset 0x1B9CC 56 bytes
javascript_obj1148_029.js
83220ac8787ac711250cf273d0dfc4490e8293ecd9bc3b0af693ebcd6c5e36bf
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1148 at offset 0x1BBDF 39 bytes
javascript_obj1157_035.js
f06298455b8ff4651f5a9d242fb76b9ade2afcff1d18bfc2486b34ca8ba4d892
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1157 at offset 0x1BF12 56 bytes
javascript_obj1221_099.js
60d6cc21ea28675c112ee23f968525664aacce23057034214c2c45c962ae80f2
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1221 at offset 0x1CC0B 62 bytes
javascript_obj1225_103.js
4d5692ecabdb7b70986e1b7c3503dd0bf014528924428ecc336b9dc3b45a7283
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1225 at offset 0x1CD0D 100 bytes
javascript_obj1232_110.js
a55075285af011688096a34be526bee63ecefeefc8f36dafe846e7581f40fdaf
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1232 at offset 0x1CECD 56 bytes
javascript_obj1239_117.js
acc73f4430059d29a068e7930d1020f6cbec1a11b9adf61b3032f15dca4a5ef4
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1239 at offset 0x1D065 98 bytes
javascript_obj1246_124.js
291158604c711b75982103d7962296feecd6fadc00997d3fa1e1d312450f10ee
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1246 at offset 0x1D222 56 bytes
javascript_obj1253_131.js
c892939ed4f56e3d486f824c0c4b7033aba87ac4e6298843ae4fb220ee90ef8a
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1253 at offset 0x1D3B5 56 bytes
javascript_obj1260_138.js
fb7b5c9bba2dea8780fa371792a185eee38106b505d2c4e5de04aed4ef3bbd15
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1260 at offset 0x1D547 56 bytes
javascript_obj1273_148.js
3ece971133e5234db8dbc9645e2c72959041277d98d29915129d7028692515f9
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1273 at offset 0x1D98B 56 bytes
javascript_obj1280_155.js
d7f69f64f944f279b62190a12fa264d5c73552f2ffa9e806a3607df782d7db8e
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1280 at offset 0x1DB1E 56 bytes
javascript_obj1299_174.js
d35923073de115d21a264cb15bde63b69c245db8c90a02f75a8d5f05233431c3
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1299 at offset 0x1DF1E 56 bytes
javascript_obj1306_181.js
aa60a2f04957d514e94226bed94040940f3e2d1d37608c47aafb20c49b6981dd
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1306 at offset 0x1E0B4 56 bytes
javascript_obj1313_188.js
03fd2e9e170051c8df3bdc872ec38932e79dbd7cba7eb2f9e6bf406c3bd79acd
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1313 at offset 0x1E246 56 bytes
javascript_obj1320_195.js
bb6f9dc84710eb2684abefa72677829515088f075de5115e2fcd61b4270d0d05
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1320 at offset 0x1E3D9 56 bytes
javascript_obj1327_202.js
e38674e438b2e9bd249d69e7142c1ee02ed5ff7ea7da2f50345cbd3227cf69ef
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1327 at offset 0x1E56C 56 bytes
javascript_obj1334_209.js
df515a0d8dce4720012d95b8def7bf17cab7221dfc5bc3ced2f5a83416baefa0
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1334 at offset 0x1E6FE 56 bytes
javascript_obj1341_216.js
4aa6aea30ebdb857b6ea1626f438d544e3beb6b5c145ac9391a6abf00f360162
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1341 at offset 0x1E898 98 bytes
javascript_obj1348_223.js
f01bd4d9f88e1a6325169e8a679770f91be52eb0af31c947a94999c168feedad
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1348 at offset 0x1EA53 56 bytes
javascript_obj1355_230.js
18edc4b1a4716a9791810770153fea38ad9a10e1e8ef237f09dff4702b79c6d3
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1355 at offset 0x1EBE4 56 bytes
javascript_obj1374_249.js
7f947c5f229a0c585a800db2ada2f3e56ef0429e3fe1a06ef2e7efdc0affa947
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1374 at offset 0x1EFE4 56 bytes
javascript_obj1381_256.js
7713bd5d40de61f3d7dfdcb7c229c4224f6206ad9a6b17894213da32c82da23f
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1381 at offset 0x1F175 56 bytes
javascript_obj1388_263.js
3cc82b2d6a53a7b3d8965bb157e1f8bcbae5a692e006af923234ff3d0d8e64bd
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1388 at offset 0x1F308 56 bytes
javascript_obj1392_267.js
6b137680f94d251896ddb9fec46fbc1b630ab200297814dc1ebf0f6c77c766b2
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1392 at offset 0x1F404 100 bytes
javascript_obj1395_270.js
fb2636669ff1cab6af2a04137ecd57c6a7cb7cbfde63b3f6e3bb240af48b97f1
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1395 at offset 0x1F4F0 39 bytes
javascript_obj1396_271.js
d6dcb4f0c3d914f030758a34eacdad783d7785c984eb01ac7b4c1cf894b91257
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1396 at offset 0x1F53F 42 bytes
javascript_obj1402_277.js
3883ea1791402a0b1d45e1bf19fc57c60327bd417fcdedebd4f7facb758d4482
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1402 at offset 0x1F692 39 bytes
javascript_obj1403_278.js
ddf77a48851fbd54db6216ba1a25d8c441041732aaa37e4c369d4d79713dcc83
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1403 at offset 0x1F6E2 42 bytes