Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e747d9a35668ad23…

MALICIOUS

PDF

91.5 KB Created: 2021-07-10 02:02:59 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2026-06-05
MD5: 0c8ce745a1a935d57beb0f49c1534e2b SHA-1: 7b2bc7c17f78be9d0eb4bad5f0ca2ca30cfdee00 SHA-256: e747d9a35668ad235909847ca8bfd3aedd80b377d5360235667d6ca8b703f21c
176 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains a link farm pointing to multiple compromised websites, suggesting a phishing or malware distribution attempt. The presence of malformed streams and a high ML classifier score, along with ClamAV detection as 'Pdf.Phishing.Trojan', strongly indicates malicious intent. Although no scripts were directly extracted, the structure and URL patterns are consistent with a phishing lure designed to redirect users to malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9954

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Malformed active-content stream length medium PDF_MALFORMED_EXPLOIT_STREAM_LENGTH
    A PDF stream that carries active/exploit-looking content has a declared /Length that does not match the recovered stream body. Malformed stream boundaries and length mismatches are common parser-evasion/supporting evidence around Reader exploit streams.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://oneremote.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/9ae5208b3f354ef65d096153819756d0/raxozasukegavefo.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://www.whirlpool-beachcomber.at/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160d7d113c4ef1---fifoluromed.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lightsourceindiana.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5ff448c4a57770088b29b5aaf6e4b425/20326429532.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://thestarbusan.net/FileData/ckfinder/files/20210615_12EAE6DBA71A933C.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nickelsgrafikdesign.de/ckfinder/userfiles/files/ruvibelipoti.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bernardthevenet.fr/ckfinder/userfiles/files/tufuxufijotapitap.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bjbtrh.com/files/pic/file/69038967318.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://alvasari.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160be9db4d6ef0---xaribixizaza.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://salonlomi.pl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608af47f81bbb---79800657991.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gz-topstar.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/968b0e51a6fb455fddc88d28aebeba69/pozigeziwadexatelape.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bracyfamilyreunion.com/clients/c/c2/c2db1a97f769835965582c74015c7782/File/zovegofajedimon.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://webgirls-studio.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16090c0e2756f4---fabozaruful.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tokyoto.pl/UserFiles/file/dibazodasab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.majorisinvestimentos.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16074326c820d9---nabofiwelivaxazavido.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kurtwohndesign.ch/userfiles/files/tunojumudipiperak.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://versobrokers.eu/userfiles/files/65779422964.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://armanetti.com/images/xokipowifif.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.isgs.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/3677cafdfc71400e7904548f71fad487/xomonotakarinidemetukizeb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.kadeavenue.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/14b59176f657b4cf5dac462cb870ee98/fosumugulosogopopirimub.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://turinhotelcompany.com/userfiles/files/zobekudemefojojuxadi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://faulkfamilync.com/clients/c/cc/ccb94402b1eed20a0583117be0c0b506/File/23513700871.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://terapie-psi.ro/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608a13a0e1eb0---34270874140.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/PmAiG5ZyT-k/uplcv?utm_term=my+self+interview+answerPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000103ea.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x103EA 17360 bytes
SHA-256: 297684ba3b67241c90d206304ac637ac513a92f0f5cb183e7da6d82140ef1079
font_01_sfnt_off0001315a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1315A 10344 bytes
SHA-256: 68806dd49150fe50864146ff795aac2671945d0a69b4b51025ddedfab00f0720
font_02_sfnt_off000148df.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x148DF 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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