Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e6ffc41b81c564d3…

MALICIOUS

PDF

38.7 KB Created: 2020-10-03 15:32:12 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-15
MD5: 7653fe3e9d2d06ad9675d2fee7f66c1b SHA-1: badb64dac4edb2e2bbf5b330f21cdb5c553b28cc SHA-256: e6ffc41b81c564d3fd0caa28d2c0300fa820c7d77dcd24d19b534a3b3dfa4cc9
224 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/strik?keyword=roblox+robloxian+high+school In PDF document text
    • http://vavomig.westspringfieldbouncehouserentals.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738693/xibis-pamukutu-jufad.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.tummystuffer101.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437139/salaruguzoven.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.rebekahrasmussen.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969571/9417e0f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036826.mozfiles.com/files/1036826/sekalikizowev.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036803.mozfiles.com/files/1036803/xigenurekiziluso.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036874.mozfiles.com/files/1036874/vawazi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036835.mozfiles.com/files/1036835/14786243048.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037111.mozfiles.com/files/1037111/sugakotevuxabizut.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1039133.mozfiles.com/files/1039133/25665552956.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1038955.mozfiles.com/files/1038955/madupelij.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036680.mozfiles.com/files/1036680/tazexenavatoposufemumo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/1c67149b-a54e-4d27-8d6e-05717eb47381/16949474224.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/4bb50da2-30e7-41c7-afb5-087093674c4d/wekuwirugadeg.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/85b73d23-5910-4dab-8e51-6da1c2a37a07/winakozalanosa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/4477991c-cf5c-463c-9aed-564a0668ee4d/kubolafinajozixorobasep.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/69c04699-50ce-4906-b542-e242b7dbcb2a/gifajupobetus.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005a1e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5A1E 5276 bytes
SHA-256: 05e5a5249227a3492a8f9c9fef4aa29d6c3268b5dffd5ef6736bcf9c0d4ee9a0
font_01_sfnt_off00006c12.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6C12 10068 bytes
SHA-256: 2b26ff6852db769c550c391864d77ecffd5f75adf702b4b9f2d62c51eac08cf8

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