Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e6f21f5c7e3ad15b…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

1.17 MB
MD5: 9bc2b592d388f483413f31730291c158 SHA-1: bcf0dac5e35e6217824936d70510b35c4bb8f1c1 SHA-256: e6f21f5c7e3ad15b1629ee6a6db6bd84a9c69fa301a7cbebb08d321a549734a8
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an encrypted OOXML file that contains embedded OLE objects, specifically identified as an Equation Editor exploit carrier. The default password encryption suggests a common method for obfuscating malicious content within Office documents. The presence of the Equation Editor OLE object strongly indicates an attempt to leverage a known vulnerability, likely for initial execution of a payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.