Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e6afaabd1e4a2c7a…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

68.8 KB Created: 2020-11-10 17:00:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: da3992522a61736e5dbc5c32978f05fe SHA-1: 670f0d608571fa8d799a98232cf2c16e8ccb9289 SHA-256: e6afaabd1e4a2c7adeedca6ee0ed095271a53a293162e3cf7ed52d570279258e
280 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The sample is an OOXML document containing VBA macros. The document body contains a lure instructing the user to enable editing and content, which is a common social engineering tactic. The VBA macros utilize Shell() and CreateObject() calls, indicative of executing arbitrary commands or launching other processes. Specifically, the use of WScript.Shell and a reference to a LOLBin suggest the script is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 8

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
  • LOLBin reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_LOLBIN
    LOLBin reference in VBA
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
e5070557051c2a8a43c1922d1f89838fc9c4f42b410883587f1a96c0e625611c		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 5381 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
vbaProject_00.bin
537e4b586ac7e723146d9d5416376f85c76dfe88c7ddeea18358777a876008c1		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 28160 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).

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