Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e6ab0d5494f77521…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.3 KB
MD5: 3d472f406d5cb1c444042276d3cbac62 SHA-1: 4e8745e327adb040efa240faab994c5e07b7614c SHA-256: e6ab0d5494f77521cecc33f0a077a2d376317b104255e807cefd5fea370f728c
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering critical heuristics related to the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate command indicates that the embedded object is designed to activate automatically upon opening, likely leading to the execution of a malicious payload. This is a common delivery mechanism for exploiting the Equation Editor vulnerability.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000074.bin
7fca21c609a1b537fec2ee995b705e8702730688f1ef14ad6a10bc6e8eb0bdf8		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x74 1998 bytes

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