Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0 — Office (OLE) / .XLSX malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e6a9f22f20f03dac…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

140.8 KB First seen: 2022-10-12
MD5: ddeac3d185b8eb1f86f374b6028c0e97 SHA-1: aadaa76ed3041162e481c1096a1d3f6216faaeb1 SHA-256: e6a9f22f20f03dac26247768410db53ca59eca0acfbcadeda8a05b0e917249b6
280 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0 · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious File T1204.002 Malicious File: Exploitation for Public-Facing Application

This Excel file is password-encrypted and contains an embedded Equation Editor OLE object, which is a known exploit carrier. Heuristics indicate a high likelihood of exploitation targeting CVE-2018-0798. The ClamAV detection name 'Xls.Downloader' suggests it functions as a downloader for further malicious payloads.

Heuristics 7

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • CVE-2018-0798 — anomalous Equation Editor native stream high CVE likely CVE_2018_0798_EQUATION_NATIVE_ANOMALY
    Default-encrypted OOXML contains embedded Equation Editor data with anomalous native stream bytes consistent with a CVE-2018-0798-style exploit. This is treated as likely CVE evidence because the Equation object is malformed and payload-like.
  • Encrypted Office package with CFB FAT corruption critical OLE_ENCRYPTED_AND_MALFORMED
    Encrypted-package shape co-occurs with FAT-chain corruption — the documented combined evasion form.
  • ClamAV: Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007, AES)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.