Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e674a6000143d4a9…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

80.0 KB Created: 2021-04-29 08:03:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: d3323cf0a9a60af00d2a6e146a569f05 SHA-1: ef18bf04bca90c10b77898663177ae62619f28d2 SHA-256: e674a6000143d4a91f4a5b7c5ff1f375fed234951461244e1e9e2dfa6d48d84e
260 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The sample is a malicious OOXML document containing VBA macros. The presence of a Document_Open macro, along with critical heuristics for Shell() and WScript.Shell usage, indicates that the macro is designed to execute arbitrary commands. This functionality is likely used to download and execute a second-stage payload, a common technique for malware delivery. No specific family could be identified, but the execution method is clear.

Heuristics 7

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7201e2f607c19530b2d9f4af082eb8051fa7a3c701421f125dcecd262dc07164		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 10737 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
e7f38d3ccdda3de7eb10c8fab5afa501badb77ee7d44d60902edd9a506e1c011		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 37376 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.

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