Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e66adc8c7bf7f97a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

40.9 KB Created: 2020-11-03 06:45:05 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-05
MD5: 2f0c6e5a82bfb843ff0bb32c4bdfe1fa SHA-1: 34f6496eb684bd9c042b78626f4a8f8feac561a6 SHA-256: e66adc8c7bf7f97a96fc2fa3ca7c3eb29f84da663c0fcc442dd8603a221a28b0
184 Risk Score
Tags
free-cdn-ebook-manual-lure

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains multiple embedded links, including one pointing to a known malicious redirector. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains text related to a 'Zoom meeting test join' and a URL that appears to be part of a link farm designed to attract traffic. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/strik?keyword=zoom+meeting+test+join In PDF document text
    • https://xepajozojiv.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134476610/221593.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mitigovoponezix.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134375948/2c4b68edab7f62.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sakukavazu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379729/9176912.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gimejexoxixaza.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131872185/jinitorip-bolag.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4379612/normal_5f92002aacec2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://murikupa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134481598/juzekebufenepimekuba.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kupujusurigov.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134471221/dfaedba304.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bififofivajarat.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134315789/e8c73d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kexinebig.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134338338/kegalubixafizabeseki.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0502/4317/4578/files/quran_tajweed_international_apk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/3860/5461/files/94511501826.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jewizopukuni/interstate_commerce_act_apush.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/3033/2060/files/koviv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0507/8030/7650/files/azar_grammar.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006439.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6439 4700 bytes
SHA-256: 5431c33688caca8671c39e617b2d963eaaded6681db98f19c9d8d0cc898ff3b3
font_01_sfnt_off0000743a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x743A 10036 bytes
SHA-256: 994210f8ffdb19f1d7ebfdf64c26966d072e3898922f15104afe552b987b2abe

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