Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e645aef24ba9b241…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

10.1 KB First seen: 2022-07-06
MD5: bf7597c04b3c217e99958f88e2c0f8d0 SHA-1: 610bd865bfb97a065b84ecdb8de23cbaf22933fb SHA-256: e645aef24ba9b241b006eeb7e3f6139cc756f82a81e1bea32125062214e6880e
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document containing a split hex Equation Editor exploit (CVE-2017-11882), which is a common delivery mechanism for malware. The document body contains a clear lure instructing the user to 'enable editing above to see the rest of the message', which is a common social engineering tactic. No scripts were extracted from the sample, but the OLE object activation is forced via the \objupdate flag.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000be4.bin
fc67bcb6c3aa6b34a87fc58584586ab954aa9e2b276fc8bd37735cec0120562c
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBE4 1980 bytes