Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e63c42b5a77986f6…

MALICIOUS

PDF

43.2 KB Created: 2020-08-01 15:02:21 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 80b1adcc0f248a29959c22c2430ed1b9 SHA-1: c5a4dd0b0b37d9f8671fb2b5c6b0d79976868e74 SHA-256: e63c42b5a77986f6ce2698042fc6e845503bd3eb68ed8134f03c2938fed0f630
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF file contains a mass of external links, many hosted on Shopify, designed to appear as legitimate content. One critical heuristic firing indicates a link to a known malicious redirector at `https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=tinker+bell+2008`. This suggests the document's primary purpose is to redirect the user to malicious infrastructure, likely for further exploitation or phishing. No scripts were extracted from this sample.

Heuristics 3

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=tinker+bell+2008
    • http://files.ataraxiaphotography.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131455883/jazozixure.pdf
    • http://files.dgassoc.net/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164520/sabizopimatoziwujif.pdf
    • http://files.willishallherald.org/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874204/nulaxexekuvale.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/1615/9381/files/tumolotukasutulagavuvu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/2696/3865/files/vuvaximupipudoporokagikaw.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/2596/4957/files/90298121174.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/4884/3934/files/lotatakesusuvuda.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/2348/3548/files/kepewewoje.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/6957/0198/files/49444925000.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/9819/3566/files/21670937378.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/7777/1162/files/99695543716.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/5900/4070/files/vujubedodokemunogiz.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006c3e.bin
d819f7e507aaecf83101f2d95c753555d11f50f5701aad520991f7fb4edb0a42
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6C3E 4912 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00007d07.bin
82fb2ae3510f704768f954f9ea1cd50d22c9008d283fc59aaca0f304dba8a33a
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7D07 10376 bytes