Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e6208325c155b89a…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

62.1 KB
MD5: a79887f6a16088002da8171f306e1c35 SHA-1: 61f8ebea354416303d5904f625255c8381852a2e SHA-256: e6208325c155b89a626654ffbf06de21ef809ba583c9742952f006326fce8493
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability related to Equation Editor. This indicates the file is designed to exploit this known vulnerability upon opening, likely to achieve arbitrary code execution. The presence of ".objdata" and ".objupdate" sections further supports the malicious intent of activating embedded objects. No specific family could be identified, but the exploit vector is clear.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000f40.bin
3ca9fc35c8848a0b4424e4dd04d98333d49c9a148c90450e6f02f8ddee0097a5
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xF40 1575 bytes