Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e612fc38cdde7713…

MALICIOUS

RTF

133.0 KB Created: 2019-01-20 14:19:00 First seen: 2019-03-10
MD5: a99ad9972833087b4687a663cc09331c SHA-1: 0a0bd24122f2d1ae0915701ab1cae86468a26ddb SHA-256: e612fc38cdde77130ce76f1f4ffde7e66948338f07b3e8f5037a7fd1be1189c4
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers heuristics for Equation Editor and CVE-2017-8759, indicating exploitation of a client execution vulnerability. The presence of shellcode API strings within an extracted artifact suggests the embedded object is a payload designed to download and execute further malicious content. No specific malware family could be identified.

Heuristics 6

  • Equation Editor CLSID critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000116d0.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x116D0 8592 bytes
SHA-256: 644724bf45a92dd8781e05b84d2e4d1a9770aa9499ba44ebc8a45ae895a92cd3
objdata_01_off00015aa0.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x15AA0 10172 bytes
SHA-256: 41f45b1fa7d21898a44da35c79c689ffa16478b65d170849dc81b530ca5433ea
objdata_02_off0001adb6.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1ADB6 12923 bytes
SHA-256: a7838a18b2bcd8213cd4a884dfa3d6b8e31cf74f5b8fc0ad17fda04863957fb1
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY, SC_STR_URLDOWNLOAD, SC_PEB_ACCESS Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: LoadLibraryW, GetProcAddress, URLDownloadToFileW, ExitProcess