Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e61173556d6d4131…

MALICIOUS

PDF

82.8 KB Created: 2021-06-17 17:33:58 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-12
MD5: 8220f24d3bfcaafcb4eca0c6fa3300c6 SHA-1: d19aed602e25f359bad9c598af1d18ec8806d5b9 SHA-256: e61173556d6d413142c7e856840367a26a0b5832c93e8df04cd3b98d13e1126d
196 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous links to external websites, many of which are hosted on compromised WordPress installations. The heuristic 'SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND' suggests the document may attempt to execute commands, possibly by leveraging embedded JavaScript, to download and execute a second-stage payload. The presence of a 'link farm' and the ML classifier's high confidence score further support the malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://crewmak.ru/uplcv?utm_term=infinite+flight+full+unlocked+apk PDF link annotation
    • https://xn--80adj7cxa.xn--p1ai/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/457d8686c149af65eaa761709dde778c/bojukorazamujo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://yarsan.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/cfde75c02b76fcc3e5cde7a046d90485/94161675078.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.reparaciondebomba.com.ar/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/gs56qnpibqqga2k6562jsucmd4/48171452719.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bayardplaza.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/6hi1qrngqndkgg7saajqsah3f8/65214176667.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://objetivovender.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160711c1ed9328---zinibuzosipixavi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://chp-travel.ir/data/file/48597029523.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://suhrsmad.dk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160846fd26a771---vexow.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://allianceflooring.net/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/6e27460ddc2d8378dd7433ff3263261a/91353071829.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ambredore.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16071d022a7f9d---38132881696.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wakingbeauty.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160cb1b6d03855---mawidixuxagusutawipulok.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sillajen.com/fckeditor/_upload/file/39538106842.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.isgs.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/d89acce0aa5ac0b74c66f57a153149bd/diledegu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://khyljg.com/uploadfiles/files/10555613964.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://someteme.com/archivos/_20210617125403.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.theagentpipeline.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160825673a9146---37078625475.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bayardplaza.co.uk/wp-content/plIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ed49.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xED49 5028 bytes
SHA-256: 4a0fbe8510402650339f98ecdc74acca890aba4016b192e0463d07d3f4dbeef7
font_01_sfnt_off0000fe5c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFE5C 21484 bytes
SHA-256: 49656b15d19330b4658540549181097736e5acf68623cba4bbe2d035701eae0b
font_02_sfnt_off00012e7a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12E7A 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 9f355172d696dda274cac500966718f112ce76951f19577ac4888987ea6471b2

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