Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e6106b7b83d74dc2…

MALICIOUS

PDF

65.4 KB Created: 2020-12-10 01:47:42 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-12
MD5: 2c28db32fa461c1e8c53367a0ab5451b SHA-1: 863b34bc0a7e1f17e069a1ab3ef5eda974be3fe8 SHA-256: e6106b7b83d74dc24b2d34a2de052079956e13d170ca72a785b0316cb55d3426
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains a significant number of embedded links, with at least two identified as pointing to malicious redirector infrastructure. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely for phishing or to download further malware. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains metadata suggesting it was generated by wkhtmltopdf, a tool sometimes used to create malicious PDFs.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/strik?utm_term=pmp+training+guide+pdf In PDF document text
    • https://vozexipazaxa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134444785/wuxuwitiruk-derexomijute-beligiboz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kasalaketowo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134871290/zoxedezonal-xonibegor.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fezuxikazosulav.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398093/jubosijemedo_betanazegu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nenuxigibasus.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134694542/laluwas.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wiwajefe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134676348/pegomufemila-sufoxomiwawajib.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vezupololepabuk.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134600483/kidozogatu_futifaforafime_jekegejawo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nugemezan.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134359438/2145551.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/e110e25d-b5c4-450c-9210-6118c8987377/74411258006.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/wapabefizosumi/80848688977.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/robumuduluwise/lumugop.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/6e20c7ac-5ecd-4383-8cd3-f2c85dff4c86/79027025151.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/17f55f72-90bd-4cea-aa69-79d81636e98c/95558737111.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000c485.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC485 5152 bytes
SHA-256: 41dae293c93ec75c56bb32f84688ca10ca3735d21d442662d44e74f728cf21c7
font_01_sfnt_off0000d5f9.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD5F9 10364 bytes
SHA-256: 40e41e66781a2fae36cee08d5d8c1ca8a68a83d915f7bc12850dc788dec50e68

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