Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e60fbf1400dc23d6…

MALICIOUS

PDF

87.6 KB Created: 2021-09-22 16:36:32 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 1cfda86e4a7aa867c8276e38e14ca443 SHA-1: 00a2944b0b44e59493609c4bc4105dac4b9e7969 SHA-256: e60fbf1400dc23d6eb6e23ee84707ad31d32c6d4369a59f170a84f2d2e0e40ed
126 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The sample is a PDF document identified as malicious by an ML classifier. It contains numerous links to external PDFs hosted on various domains, many of which appear to be disposable or low-reputation. The heuristic 'PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK' specifically points to a suspicious URL, suggesting a download lure. The presence of QR code lures further supports a phishing or social engineering attack vector.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9976

Heuristics 6

  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://inprovitmexico.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/suremubobojekaw.pdf
    • http://ghinelliarchitettura.it/userfiles/files/69245027019.pdf
    • http://proreferee.ru/uploads/ckfinder/files/22078454239.pdf
    • https://www.tai.gr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16148f741e264f---47225485731.pdf
    • http://metamorfozyayincilik.com/userfiles/file/fupezisemukajexabimefako.pdf
    • http://bannhuaduong.net/upload/files/51592214174.pdf
    • http://ecme.site/2015/vat/upload/files/47711814047.pdf
    • http://skolicka.eu/foto/images/file/6943703068.pdf
    • http://studioagronomoserragiotto.eu/userfiles/files/28405542985.pdf
    • https://jnvhardoi.org/ckfinder/userfiles/files/17229655438.pdf
    • http://dongshengcable.com/images/upload/File/fasufefebopujabubonup.pdf
    • http://methese.com/upload/files/nipap.pdf
    • https://path.mn/userfiles/files/93377747993.pdf
    • http://ilkjv.com/Images/Media/files/ziporamedobagefij.pdf
    • http://mictrogiang.com/userfiles/files/wisofikoworajajiw.pdf
    • https://dortmundpools.com/contents/files/58272352585.pdf
    • http://hotel-gerard-dalsace.com/upload/document/xunimevofavutabe.pdf
    • http://dokturmice.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/kavilixiwivefidelab.pdf
    • http://attep.com/home/sandbox/domains/heekee.com.hk/public_html/ckfinder/userfiles/files/61619574963.pdf
    • http://sushistoryus.com/uploads/files/zedusopitojatuzomusesoza.pdf
    • http://taispacedesign.com/upload/files/21705249164.pdf
    • http://lucidareemantenerepavimentifaidate.it/userfiles/files/kelojadu.pdf
    • https://superchills.com/userfiles/file/mijafenupiket.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/LPIa9PGmDLg/uplcv?utm_term=fafnir+f4+qr+code
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f0c1.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF0C1 16792 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000108d3.bin
0c856a4913b2ab35440e8f52be5c55ce50abcd3911b680339c0cde158f09d705		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x108D3 18768 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00013985.bin
06d9a6aae00746c8fd7b332fd1d143cde8e2e3f0c4eb6a450df1fe54c5f0951a		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13985 10360 bytes

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