Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e5f3772e2e653c5a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

40.7 KB Created: 2020-08-04 16:52:28 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: ed074072fea5814e25515d70995ee97b SHA-1: 6cf68199b2dbe33396326833bc9703872d58fe37 SHA-256: e5f3772e2e653c5a28f0dbf912d89d3d9b7c1fec31128bfe9fcafefc7c66dbf8
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF file contains numerous embedded links, with one specifically pointing to a known malicious redirector. The document body and heuristics suggest a lure impersonating a cloud document service to trick users into clicking the malicious link. The presence of multiple Shopify URLs, while some are benign, indicates a link farm strategy. The primary malicious URL is https://ttraff.ru/pify?keyword=learn+android+tutorials+point+pdf.

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Cloud document impersonation lure medium SE_CLOUD_DOC_LURE
    Document impersonates a cloud file-sharing service such as SharePoint, OneDrive, Google Drive, Dropbox, Box, or Microsoft 365 and asks the user to open, verify, or access a shared document
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/pify?keyword=learn+android+tutorials+point+pdf
    • http://files.cstshoponline.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437149/bdae941433c76e.pdf
    • http://kojusa.woodworkerhowardlobb.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407089/95008250e50c.pdf
    • http://files.caseyharvilla.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132712214/vevuzupakaki.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/8814/2743/files/rupenogu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/3580/4319/files/kaxazekujula.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/76957488457.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/4857/4884/files/29052609520.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/9461/3924/files/kiresaxodi.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/5597/1492/files/bireritaruverow.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/7730/4484/files/63107896578.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/2699/7663/files/sofofigalev.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/5891/2662/files/16084766236.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9655/6191/files/zusovegudevagur.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/7096/3366/files/niporo.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006251.bin
91f21c0f50a012a6faa4bea35d064143a78888f80e22f46120f7d4a78effd4be		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6251 4976 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00007353.bin
29168c66e06d50dd8c1c36860b522368786774e983bf7f8de16c7b9a79002247		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7353 10064 bytes

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