Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e5d66ddc48d4a133…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

307.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-05-26
MD5: a501c84834fd014dd0796ae6b69302ed SHA-1: ef95ca6888ce617de6c134a9e9beb2093b4dea33 SHA-256: e5d66ddc48d4a1335644242ae6d024a24d27e6b361b9ecf956002bbd70b34097
112 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is an Excel file that exploits CVE-2017-0199 via an OLE2Link object to download a remote payload from the URL http://109.248.144.230/it/itititititititititititi%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23ititititit.doc. Although no VBA code was found to be executable, the presence of the CVE-2017-0199 exploit and the embedded URL strongly indicate a malicious downloader. The secondary embedded PDF also contains suspicious findings.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings high POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://109.248.144.230/it/itititititititititititi%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23ititititit.doc

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00011600.pdf
153bc41e19aaa61217ec0966ab226681a42ab8ff3777f0b3288b1e34ca1db095		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x11600 243712 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00015e00.pdf
1de397279b5226b24a0648ad7cb205b214fd4407daea04509a17bdeaad6f6514		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x15E00 225280 bytes

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