Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e5d3f77e814bb0df…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

683.0 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: ed7928a72e06e8122d90ae9eb43736d6 SHA-1: 784a817af018202ee02bad8760c85b996942a38b SHA-256: e5d3f77e814bb0dfe7773205bf105a2b9d08f6f0245b7c1808e1c72748e180e9
102 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an OLE2Link object that exploits CVE-2017-0199 to load a remote resource. The embedded URL 'https://s.deemos.com/lqSa1Aoh?&linen=frightened&trumpet' is highly suspicious and likely serves as a loader for a second-stage payload. Additionally, a secondary embedded PDF was found with suspicious static findings, indicating a multi-stage attack. The presence of an embedded URL in the document text further supports the malicious intent.

Heuristics 4

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings high POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 1 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.wowform.com

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
polyglot_child_pdf_off0005ae00.pdf
59ce6ea8f5b08245aee0c3a45088e54bc428fafe2106f97e7529eea5b62243ce		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x5AE00 327168 bytes

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