Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e5aafbd1cc734f85…

MALICIOUS

PDF

29.2 KB Created: 2013-02-04 13:49:43 Authoring application: BVueMyGp (via XWbt14Wq2SGq8) First seen: 2026-05-09
MD5: ae4ffe2dc62c290d969893c2a2c56eac SHA-1: a43a41741903b54d4ab13aeb1c6217a7034a7007 SHA-256: e5aafbd1cc734f85aed1bfc97c385674c3e8781b6078f268e783cd62434cfd7b
72 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The ML classifier strongly indicates maliciousness, and the PDF contains an embedded file. This suggests the PDF is being used as a lure to deliver a malicious executable. The presence of an embedded file points towards an Ingress Tool Transfer technique, likely delivered via a Spearphishing Attachment.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9094

Heuristics 6

  • Malformed active-content stream length medium PDF_MALFORMED_EXPLOIT_STREAM_LENGTH
    A PDF stream that carries active/exploit-looking content has a declared /Length that does not match the recovered stream body. Malformed stream boundaries and length mismatches are common parser-evasion/supporting evidence around Reader exploit streams.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/ In PDF document text
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xci/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.2/In PDF document text
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xfdf/In PDF document text
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-form/2.8/In PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0016.bin pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 16 at offset 0x176A 28171 bytes
SHA-256: 3dc28ed4e4a4e43f36fd32d78703fa8a8b53f1fe53601b527f97ee60ffcee5cd
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
stream_018_off000056aa.bin decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x56AA 120 bytes
SHA-256: 8028c643df4e264224bbf458f3d784a956b1606e3ec50ae4c1280f74a3ecec09

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