Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e59f0aa13e2da2a0…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

155.0 KB Created: 2022-07-23 06:42:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2022-08-10
MD5: 357ef37979b02b08120895ae5175eb0a SHA-1: eac7472c61013ee22225299bd2e34177bda83179 SHA-256: e59f0aa13e2da2a0cd5c07e882014d9b37927b9bd9a493f83c2bcb103e5a739c
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious OOXML document containing a VBA macro with an AutoOpen subroutine, indicating it is designed to execute automatically upon opening. The VBA script constructs a URL, 'asssambly.mywebcommunity.org/file/upload', which is likely used to download and execute a second-stage payload. The document body itself is a plausible lure, requesting expert opinions on North Korea's economy to trick the user into opening the malicious file.

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Valyria-10021468-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Valyria-10021468-0
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
cc4aa59c10df5907fad52b69cbc12f6b376845b49ecee7457d4bba8bac10563a		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 2153 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
afae7f2d07b26b943cbf7bb8710d1fc8e88734a36f3fe0b0bd743e8949a65963		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 12288 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Valyria-10021468-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely

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