Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e5541ffd16eb0677…

MALICIOUS

PDF

75.1 KB Created: 2021-02-22 19:41:39 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-29
MD5: 01986bf03a71924d11388d99a8a58a69 SHA-1: 34a2fed27729d0d58479d943843c6b8df2ccd033 SHA-256: e5541ffd16eb0677616423196dbe63c20b7aca8b1fe13f2f4fba0ad47d7984ef
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file was flagged as malicious by a machine learning classifier and ClamAV. It contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm or SEO spam operation. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, appears to be related to search terms, further supporting this. The primary attack pattern involves redirecting users to potentially malicious external websites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://seumenha.ru/wix?keyword=sookie+stackhouse+dead+ever+after+pdf PDF link annotation
    • https://kagivosivozavex.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134746508/dojanekubo-vopobuzife-dugosepezesop-zabasewo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/wepiwojeta/tBYFigO/aws_iot_architecture_best_practices.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kegegofelev.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681159/revovikuxid_dexasa_selujemag_sodoxok.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://datinge.site/wuzegikijuzizibefawepifof2qc57.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vimasavugaf.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134587410/5755906.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://smartycredit.info/hollywood_animals_movies_tamil_dubbedobnra.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gobodukigibab.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856162/8911677.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tenivutod.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070705/wewim.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xuvuvigaxopezut.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134721928/pafuridura-livekebum-tezagotuwejajud.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ru-payment.casa/rokewunizajiduvwzvq.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://waruzakelejabu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134600446/8183205.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rasetakewalufil.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/6/0/136086978/9848455.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vexefanakaxaki.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134871487/abb33.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/bezorito/defensa_siciliana_najdorf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/supefujoxopubu/63047941701.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/bikikanafopavu/creature_3d_video_hd_song.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000eb80.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEB80 5440 bytes
SHA-256: 9f5a7c1817358a1475306fa447dbef9b68fb14a889c5cf5b55c3bb94354da027
font_01_sfnt_off0000fe02.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFE02 9680 bytes
SHA-256: 245353f906bb21ce5332e898f83c6c57a78e6fdca29b60d241788ab548e61039

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