Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e53fddf84069381b…

MALICIOUS

PDF

104.2 KB Created: 2021-06-07 03:26:33 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-11-25
MD5: e6779516e47da46f493e01c9b3eb4974 SHA-1: 6a330084bc667f1518dcc85791a91aefea9e0098 SHA-256: e53fddf84069381bcb7fce5919f3e8fd397ee3ea3e13e3d819f1c0a3792ef102
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many pointing to disposable hosting, suggesting a link farm or SEO spamming operation. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection indicate malicious intent, likely phishing or malware distribution. While no scripts were directly extracted, the PDF structure and external link farm are indicative of a phishing lure, often delivered via spearphishing attachments.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://pixomot.ru/pbw?utm_term=scrabble+cheat+sheet+2017+fantasy PDF link annotation
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4417222/normal_5ff775b6da2a6.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jusisobopat.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134326654/1411641.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4495269/normal_600b8fd60310a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://votumojelobi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134848055/zifimiwera_zukef_xilaxirewepu_demubaj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4462035/normal_6021d0214d5db.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kugatovobubusub.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134680339/060880142594c10.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pazaduzot.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134473777/xudifosus.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://welajelozasap.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134695810/tedoredazase_zanijiwofiva_garitonefu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fulotetaputu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740707/jorabagedusozawifura.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bukalejobiwasek.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131409200/4865023.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4426072/normal_601aa0b1562f6.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pibofarijefi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134648305/b419bc.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4381289/normal_5ff9059ac49ef.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xojemejavema.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/3/9/133987363/9629335.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://zuvuzut.pbworks.com/f/wobuzewetasuso.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tagexoba.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/144758853/zatatowuvexasotafe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0001582d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1582D 5720 bytes
SHA-256: dbbcc634bae2f400780b43914a0863ef71d6786229f96247223b7cd1211c5167
font_01_sfnt_off00016bb5.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x16BB5 11816 bytes
SHA-256: f6a3db5ddcd63a98ac4091b38c4b1c48eb879f43e809194d3028556a042f9560