RTF malware analysis — malicious · e531efb5f24bfa4e

MALICIOUS

RTF

336.0 KB First seen: 2019-05-16

MD5: 65a9b6cac5d176dca2116e0e30bcdbca SHA-1: be1d47fec0899fe9e522201e731f06af55645054 SHA-256: e531efb5f24bfa4efdc296b3602baa56180adef474bfe221885c68b218308a57

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that leverages a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component. The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `RTF_OBJUPDATE` heuristics strongly indicates exploitation of this component to achieve arbitrary code execution. The `RTF_OBJAUTLINK` suggests the object is designed to be activated automatically upon opening.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00008bd0.bin`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x8BD0	98768 bytes
SHA-256: `aa437125ba4f79ee89d8e294e68923e00c90b11103192b539bcac257862834bf`

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