Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e51ac0524888b72b…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

20.6 KB First seen: 2022-08-29
MD5: 86d19dabc38ec7c12f19c28633c64ae7 SHA-1: a4359e39c247cf4d3bed92f8afe8a67336359465 SHA-256: e51ac0524888b72bf9ea6f11e848356f39f82568f8a1ec2ca3d93712e8863153
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 User Execution T1204.002 Malicious File T1566 Phishing T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The file is an RTF document containing OLE object data and specifically targets the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of the SE_ENABLE_LURE heuristic indicates a user-enablement lure, suggesting the document's primary purpose is to trick the user into activating malicious content. No scripts were extracted, and the document body was heavily obfuscated, making further analysis of the payload difficult.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001e99.bin
8865306427800609ea6f8d3f8a89395baf504c46b1a8e37282b4a33fa1d68516
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1E99 4279 bytes