Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e501801ebbe07c1b…

MALICIOUS

PDF

89.4 KB Created: 2021-07-01 00:30:43 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 2bd2a42d59ede90e660e36c1225a29a5 SHA-1: 2163ff6874811c742847627281b1a6b2f44afca0 SHA-256: e501801ebbe07c1b3573b989ce9cab19bf7c0cdf7583b3c2f8f10920cbada099
176 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains numerous embedded URIs pointing to external websites, many of which are hosted on compromised WordPress installations or disposable domains. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly indicate malicious intent, likely for phishing or distributing further malware. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and URI patterns are consistent with a malicious link farm designed to lure users to malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9835

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Clickable URI points to raw IP address medium PDF_URI_IP_LITERAL
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose host is a literal IPv4 address. Legitimate documents normally link to named domains; raw-IP destinations are common in disposable phishing and malware-delivery infrastructure.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://uangraja.com/contents//files/44086426748.pdf
    • https://accuratesearch.com/userfiles/file/nabilupurakepufiz.pdf
    • http://www.ashtralmedia.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607b75a7ae98c---liremerebomadapeko.pdf
    • https://patriot.ch/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/59cjmtqmhtfg0vhhakgrp0oq2c/gixigasemi.pdf
    • http://104.156.58.56/~web2inbox/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c58fe15e5b9---67099663555.pdf
    • https://mission4recruitment.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606d19a83d78f---kowitiwugiduluboz.pdf
    • https://thietbidienmanhcuong.com/upload/files/16851784505.pdf
    • https://stellabakingcompany.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606f9be5dde51---xigabigabivofelevagaxa.pdf
    • https://gaseg.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/9pg1c0n6vp283rjc4vr1buq9v6/81826696066.pdf
    • https://smoothnomad.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/p40d59e5rca3f946oc35pg4mek/fokeza.pdf
    • http://saludocupacionalpso.com/home/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160718bdd256c2---93533555797.pdf
    • https://atx-stroy.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/66af85d35760dfb1b23e446e2411f2cd/78570012685.pdf
    • http://www.ausafrica.co.za/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160822f37ba5de---zusidikovivulojatusu.pdf
    • https://www.lowdoc-loans.com.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160751da072a00---dunipitepovimut.pdf
    • https://advicezone.org.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/bm1pbll3hp60plkstps72m5u6l/42094094295.pdf
    • https://leicht-spb.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/07cc61367d423c189f0f0de7ef1a558b/88013580060.pdf
    • http://augustaelectricalwork.com/editorData/file/sajuzafesaxepexib.pdf
    • http://daindnc.com/fckeditor/userfiles/file/radanuv.pdf
    • https://www.electriclighting.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/12cebe8faa03bdb8a3da831244284760/wekigenujasavaba.pdf
    • http://socialbomjesus.org.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bd3c72746c0---17584351078.pdf
    • https://maidintown.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/3ce1b1ba5b6f19cbd7c3fd03c5a8f0d4/51946228934.pdf
    • https://cffcommunications.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1/160d038f3ef0b6---77709807803.pdf
    • http://www.fsnn.se/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606d5e285eaec---94481472248.pdf
    • http://ophtalmic-overnight.fr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606ff95772088---bipetanepomug.pdf
    • https://www.growxponential.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/qm8d0t05c47l3k81sbvti81nru/tuxuze.pdf
    • https://masihpt2.com/contents//files/16176645508.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/3CAf4wW3hvY/uplcv?utm_term=wasp+sting+one+week+later
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000fc2f.bin
d2d114452610e5f370bbfba6c090a12f45ca8d12b4866297e8b8812925b1f9b1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFC2F 16780 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000127c9.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x127C9 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00013fe0.bin
8d3a75f3160bc438d1374bbdd96f8defb0c6f61b58ab57436471ac16ad283b8c
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13FE0 10600 bytes