Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e4f73b7c1885a7b4…

MALICIOUS

PDF

71.4 KB Created: 2021-02-17 15:44:11 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-11-20
MD5: a334bc3451a463f411c61155d9dadca1 SHA-1: a6fabd4a3372c210d38d6255351ff4452240063e SHA-256: e4f73b7c1885a7b450913ad1932af71e293ecdda8097a7a2d90bf5077ee802ec
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF file contains a large number of external links, many pointing to disposable domains and Weebly-hosted PDFs, indicating a link farm. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent, likely related to phishing or SEO poisoning. The embedded URLs are designed to redirect users to a collection of other PDF files, potentially serving as a distribution point for malware or further phishing attempts.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://jottigo.ru/strik?utm_term=historia+universal+libro+de+secundaria+pdf PDF link annotation
    • https://mipajadotafev.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132814286/8c0dc772.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://belexikezetuvom.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775063/bigokek_difopomi_duxiwut_purufexo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://all-host.site/acanthamoeba_sppty0fz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dururamud.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134846475/lewuma-diribidene-latovudekebasef.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://siondez.ru/the_mirror_and_the_lamp_abrams51tle.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://creditreportus.info/gps_app_for_android_phonewfokk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vinovubetiloj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134679092/savefufop.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tazesarazuf.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134726557/wupinililo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pigaxapi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132815084/temeruxixadokidizot.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://smcjd.com/inkubator_ne_shitje561bx.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://powelogub.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871449/desenenezow.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • http://nibosifex.epizy.com/how_to_maintain_a_generac_generator.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ce27.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCE27 5192 bytes
SHA-256: 1ecb3ee6221465db7df956535f96f2f84912526fc839d8c4b9dee40d803f9365
font_01_sfnt_off0000dfd2.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDFD2 10564 bytes
SHA-256: 974c29ce335a27adc1e5ede86313cd32362f255bed49d23e9fb35acfc42a818e
font_02_sfnt_off00010295.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10295 4324 bytes
SHA-256: b50a2106bf82917db0cd3cf88f63c5e8cc3298b343ace5cffc591b35df33d24c

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