RTF malware analysis — malicious · e4dc8a609323351a

MALICIOUS

RTF

3.40 MB Created: 2024-04-03 08:46:00 First seen: 2025-06-23

MD5: fc171e1e74eeb1730e7006c46aa0bf55 SHA-1: ab391477886c32f5f3f5ad4142f262d3cc8a12fb SHA-256: e4dc8a609323351a92e7f1cbc6718793ae61af764fd7e43d99eb2c761c26051d

342 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The RTF document contains multiple indicators of malicious activity, including embedded OLE objects and critical firings for CVE-2017-11882. The presence of a PE header within the hex-encoded OLE object data strongly suggests that the document is designed to exploit this vulnerability to deliver a secondary payload. The document body itself contains only font information, providing no direct clues to the user-facing lure.

Heuristics 9

CVE-2017-11882 — Equation Editor FONT record overflow critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882

Equation Editor MTEF contains an overlong FONT typeface field, the vulnerable copy primitive for CVE-2017-11882. This is stronger evidence than the Equation Editor CLSID alone because it identifies the malformed record that drives code execution in EQNEDT32.EXE.
Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED

RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
PE header (with DOS stub) in hex data critical RTF_MZ_HEX

Hex-encoded PE (MZ + DOS stub) found inside RTF — likely an embedded executable payload
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX

RTF contains ~1361KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL http://ocsp.verisign.com0
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml
- https://www.verisign.com/rpa
- http://csc3-2010-crl.verisign.com/CSC3-2010.crl0D
- https://www.verisign.com/rpa0
- http://csc3-2010-aia.verisign.com/CSC3-2010.cer0
- https://www.verisign.com/cps0*
- http://logo.verisign.com/vslogo.gif04
- http://crl.verisign.com/pca3-g5.crl04
- https://www.globalsign.com/repository/0
- http://ocsp.globalsign.com/ca/gstsacasha384g40C
- http://secure.globalsign.com/cacert/gstsacasha384g4.crt0
- http://crl.globalsign.com/ca/gstsacasha384g4.crl0
- http://ocsp2.globalsign.com/rootr606
- http://crl.globalsign.com/root-r6.crl0G

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00003a12.bin` `24317e064f88ed0d7aeedc38a881982a0b46446e5e4fa183df7464a4eb6d7d77`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x3A12	693482 bytes
`objdata_01_off00161c18.bin` `72bd76599c17052cc34443573f8b849d1967d3263c0e0f0118bc6c097634a998`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x161C18	584266 bytes

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