Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e4d96e57fe489648…

MALICIOUS

PDF

112.2 KB Created: 2021-02-08 05:31:36 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-11-02
MD5: 1d1823be2b1171325ae71241099a7975 SHA-1: ee407a672c1eb9b569cd83eae6c3398d1ebd43bf SHA-256: e4d96e57fe48964889d58eefd6587d8a893738b7b2bb45c675a959f508565a64
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, indicating a link farm or SEO manipulation scheme. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent, likely to distribute further malware or phishing content. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and numerous external URLs point towards a malicious distribution or redirection mechanism.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://jacksth.ru/aws?utm_term=careless+driving+sentencing+guidelines+uk PDF link annotation
    • https://niloberu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739427/kawewigugeji.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xefakuwejufo.iblogger.org/gugebufuxanejuvorib.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bididanigatozum.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134314142/1a9d355785f0cf6.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pixavegabub.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135307945/7a412.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/noperizapewo/h3hh447/14431189091.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4465907/normal_5fd5f01e0f189.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dirotigakavomak.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134235834/1151404.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xewoxexe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134398473/69f9b8a4c2a546d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nateguwab.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453796/a41e18767.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kavisovilige.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135308643/xaniseta.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4500904/normal_6017b3543ab6a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/zafupusapun/ihgi69O/slither._io_cheat_codes_android.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/vipatajase/aEIVhiy/lapiredelekenaruwek.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • http://pezukovurarugor.rf.gd/adam_4017_software.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kagiweluxipo.epizy.com/airtel_message_settings.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00016e03.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x16E03 5024 bytes
SHA-256: 94e54fa50859943eaee340ca56e35d023bd470352a2a4f23b8e8db29e71604a7
font_01_sfnt_off00017f30.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x17F30 10616 bytes
SHA-256: b9ef0821804c291653dc5ba51f88de0268841f245da495c63100849193ad1c5e
font_02_sfnt_off0001a365.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1A365 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 9f355172d696dda274cac500966718f112ce76951f19577ac4888987ea6471b2

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