Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e4d0f715a7e9698b…

MALICIOUS

PDF

82.7 KB Created: 2021-09-19 19:49:48 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-14
MD5: 32fd77d3ee5d47425c7b13824e06d560 SHA-1: 6bf06636054266a1b9682f8f7ac1d3c0f8b0dac9 SHA-256: e4d0f715a7e9698b32f7304501298269bf2c9fc195fb8e45b04545bbb4e2ae7a
176 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link

This PDF document was flagged by ClamAV as a phishing trojan. It contains numerous embedded URLs that form a link farm, directing users to potentially compromised WordPress upload storage and other disposable hosting sites. The heuristic 'SE_QR_LURE' suggests the document may also instruct users to scan a QR code, a common tactic in phishing campaigns. No scripts were extracted, but the extensive use of external links indicates a strong intent to redirect users to malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9960

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://allytemp.ru/uplcv?utm_term=what+is+my+phone%27s+wifi+password PDF link annotation
    • https://fasleh.net/Files/files/77687276102.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kitapkaplama.com/upload/ckfinder/files/wesijixabaxizerojat.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bilcafe.it/userfiles/file/13152689311.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://e-kva.ru/admin/ckfinder/userfiles/files/18567932180.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.andeanskyline.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16140ce4479f98---10730636302.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://smolensk-bakaleya.ru/userfiles/file/88425548563.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://hinaweb.com/upload/file/xuxofovujeb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://playgametoday.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5eadfa9586cce96bfac79bda733aa396/23232758611.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://alenakovalchuk.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ac26e16e13e803f8c7dda658e624fcf8/37520275826.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xn--i1aam8cb.xn--p1ai/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/d4783f1981e0bd1f667fc817dcf76b2f/botoloweti.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://finestblogger.de/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/472gto5o2na5j6mr9kea4akmel/80612231104.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lawcab.ru/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16130ad611b9c8---84453275613.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.unidacardoso.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16132e4ee3d6a1---92869243779.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kdbelektrotechniek.nl/uploads/file/bijavifeza.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.artikel238.nl/emmwebbit/resources/ckfinder/userfiles/files/42091135693.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lobi.md/userfiles/file/17181358176.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.optionassurance.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16146198148d46---larupedipamafukoxizasupi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ibeguiristain.com/userfiles/files/kenepisogevoluxalojuze.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rux-thai.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/27134646852.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ydchem.cn/filespath/files/20210908201823.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nemdanangpho.com/uploads/2021-09-11/images/files/vulizevofuvemoxu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://thessalonikiflights.com/files/files/jopexuz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.saenger-ohg.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16131d7463a0b2---32915454579.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000dd93.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDD93 10944 bytes
SHA-256: 7b9fff9e69d505f0f6ce1564424ac3d4261cfb0de44c4ae85ffc431ec636fc00
font_01_sfnt_off0000f6e8.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF6E8 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_02_sfnt_off00010efa.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10EFA 18084 bytes
SHA-256: ec9886462b68eef244bec21dfe0b9d3fc95d9a86e3882a85b0ef0711c235a700

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