Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e4c78bac48491d22…

MALICIOUS

PDF

93.5 KB Created: 2021-09-16 08:46:59 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-11-24
MD5: 83397a018138b715c1eefd65c730e731 SHA-1: 7890b279cf1b8445765d2fbe071b8ecc73954c07 SHA-256: e4c78bac48491d22cd2bf4397f8a189fd9556698c863207c4e3d723473c27f89
172 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains an embedded JavaScript stream and numerous external URIs, many of which point to link farms hosted on compromised or disposable domains. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely for phishing or malware distribution. The embedded JavaScript is likely used to obfuscate the links or perform malicious actions.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9969

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Urgency / deadline lure low SE_URGENCY_LURE
    Document contains urgency or deadline language ('account will be terminated', 'action required within 24 hours', etc.) — useful context, but low-signal without other findings
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://wastran.ru/uplcv?utm_term=seven+brides+for+seven+brothers+full+movie+online PDF link annotation
    • http://geomanteia.com/userfiles/files/70499296701.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://riolospettacoli.it/filesUploads/file/toraforako.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rmissio.pl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613a4b59b2972---sadufi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://idolyokocho.com/js/ckfinder/userfiles/files/warev.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://granitabrasive.com/editor_up/resokigaworani.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kroonzuivel.nl/ckfinder/userfiles/files/90847967607.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ccswcd.com/userfiles/file/19026091557.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://spandoekland.nl/userfiles/file/boxoxojuduka.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://naoshima-habitant.com/images/blog/file/13180989071.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://manu-transport.com/documents/file/posil.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://devcons.org/uploads/userfiles/files/fexefuxowakuge.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://25630638.kad.tw/kads/ckfinder/userfiles/files/6004390520.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://visualpaint.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16142cfba7c67c---8081535901.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.jindatunnel.com/up_files/file/9729816722.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pet.nfe.go.th/m_site/ckfinder/userfiles/files/56468414170.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://strandedtattoo.net/file/fatoguwajojezukuf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lotte-ppta.com/beta/assets/file/10597533700.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://americansemitruckparts.com/d/files/voboxat.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://osoboebludo.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/2251077593.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://chicagohalo.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161396e8398cd2---lojuranapuputabi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://greece-ex.com/images/blog/file/25394653256.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nwhouse.ru/uploads/file/wuvusej.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://serrechevalier-skifun.com/imagesfile/70427868931.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0001040e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1040E 10840 bytes
SHA-256: 1d8b551593572ed13a2ad74602c43fc1bc716abb66e640f614b6ea601fc9e04b
font_01_sfnt_off00011cda.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11CDA 19268 bytes
SHA-256: 06d3890bd42664c3d33b6e5ed4f7c5f5b021c8039f90442aa31749010ad3782e
font_02_sfnt_off00014f79.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x14F79 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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