Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCM — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e4bfe6ce16497108…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCM

41.4 KB Created: 2016-02-24 09:00:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: 07eac9b85afb058e0666a1555a1712ee SHA-1: f17c45d17f8e438e1864c820f18e866ad2ffa4d0 SHA-256: e4bfe6ce16497108ce89c7e4eae155667e5d44346ae875c20c61fbd0fcb596c5
302 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The file is a DOCM document containing a VBA macro that is automatically executed upon opening (AutoOpen). The macro utilizes CreateObject and CallByName functions, typical for downloading and executing further payloads. ClamAV signatures confirm this behavior, identifying it as 'Doc.Downloader.Bendis-6680540-0'. The macro's intent is to download and execute a second-stage payload, as indicated by the heuristic firings and ClamAV detection.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Bendis-6680540-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Bendis-6680540-0
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • CallByName call high OLE_VBA_CALLBYNAME
    CallByName call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
cc4d256221a841dab1379dbe9b63464f310f75f6e7c06d432a2e711134e0b432
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 15726 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
c5a378d61980866fd0c0611621586faa61fcaaf793d4b2f56318d553cb113dbf
vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 62976 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Bendis-6680540-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.