Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e4bf3482d26d267d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

371.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-05-22
MD5: 5e8c06644329c4e07c5aa489642d00da SHA-1: 996d8a67ee41f6d8ef1f83dab9737cd60f933a54 SHA-256: e4bf3482d26d267d085cf99152a07e15e026fd809c4636e938a615a6d29e2c2c
110 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The critical heuristic firing for CVE_2017_0199 indicates that the OLE object is attempting to load a remote resource from the URL http://103.133.104.112/ili/ililili%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23tilili.doc. Although no VBA code was found to be executable, the presence of an embedded PDF with suspicious findings and the OLE vulnerability strongly suggest a downloader or exploit delivery mechanism. The embedded URL is the primary indicator of compromise.

Heuristics 4

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings high POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://103.133.104.112/ili/ililili%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23tilili.doc
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00011600.pdf
992cb1487fe0d92d2c17a59839d6a3b85089f91b01609e68dafdf55ac6d4d799		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x11600 309248 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00028a00.pdf
1051b80ab3fe269b31b0a42ac7eb7a3c75dfc9cce9b0203da2f189a30a7ae663		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x28A00 214016 bytes

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