Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e4874b06ea5b9e10…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1020.1 KB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: aa4711b9727011bd0c67806c4476cab9 SHA-1: 947fd7a3958ea2655e77006e20e2fcef0ef83aa6 SHA-256: e4874b06ea5b9e1017648c3ca451367a84c9d79917b01fc40ef50ff9a97982e1
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the CVE-2017-8759 vulnerability via the Equation Editor. This indicates an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability for code execution. No scripts were extracted, and the document body was heavily obfuscated, preventing further analysis of the payload's intent.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000e86b1.bin
0a4abe8e1e65644e715ad3cc93df8d355cc90aa93fb1eb3094b96e7488c02313
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xE86B1 3732 bytes