Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e46e5be869cd5d87…

MALICIOUS

PDF

90.2 KB Created: 2021-01-11 18:44:27 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-11-02
MD5: 7379e2464ccf522bdb0fb51aae3f677d SHA-1: 741e724a0e0a4180cacc40899e01156996e995cf SHA-256: e46e5be869cd5d87bc982e3e2f51dda96853858f362a6ea932f0a9886540fe86
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains multiple embedded links, with at least one identified as a malicious redirector. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains text related to 'guided dove hunts' and metadata indicating it was generated by wkhtmltopdf, suggesting a lure document designed to redirect users to malicious infrastructure.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffine.ru/aws?utm_term=guided+dove+hunts+near+dallas In PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/xufaribo/jckWhfp/funny_message_sms_ringtone_download.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rofosuvobatijam.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134661532/a68a21b498.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kisewosa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070890/6883262.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/juxerawabuf/Dh36xib/xogunaxesevigituva.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wifusewaxoxuxi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134497844/videsivigikasabubas.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1178142.mozfiles.com/files/1178142/tap_tap_shots_hacked.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dawifebenunu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134374742/ruvaduwinujugizoxi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nukofagola.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134883999/643e42e66a429.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pumutetigowon.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134699291/bimivepar_mivigime.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fodezamu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407453/zuvekazabuz-topofelo-gupolekodojavo-ponabiloxe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xizejaselaz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134357450/5581035.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/samopakamefap/zidejifutulemul.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/mozirolinitaje/zaxivemafixuzogomofitig.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00012480.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12480 5004 bytes
SHA-256: 7033d471526986169f97de2068571f0c420d93c4fd788026151f79eb5f109122
font_01_sfnt_off00013583.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13583 11376 bytes
SHA-256: 37402b71a723579b95d877aa2abc72c648307fa57afd48895f77ef15e59ed200

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