PDF malware analysis — malicious · e466f87f6ec9c5fc

MALICIOUS

PDF

12.1 KB

MD5: 3ec8d435ad3b0a4a348446a16565c8aa SHA-1: cfb0cadcde28bb52bd9c0704f641ec70e4035fea SHA-256: e466f87f6ec9c5fc22e67a74a785528d59f729d9dac58180482e15a43e20d0cd

186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.001 JavaScript/JScript T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript, specifically leveraging the CVE-2007-5659 vulnerability through the Collab.collectEmailInfo method. The analysis recovered a deobfuscated JavaScript stage, indicating a complex execution chain. This JavaScript is likely responsible for downloading and executing a second-stage payload, as suggested by the presence of multiple JavaScript artifacts and the ClamAV detection signature 'Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36063'.

Heuristics 7

Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659

PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36063 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36063
Annotation subject callee-key hex JavaScript stager high PDF_ANNOT_SUBJECT_CALLEE_HEX_STAGER

PDF JavaScript uses syncAnnotScan()/getAnnots() to read an indirect annotation /Subject stream, percent-decodes it through marker replacement, then uses a callee.toString()-derived key to decode and eval the final exploit stage.
JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT

PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS

PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
syncAnnotScan annotation-staging primitive low PDF_FOXIT_SYNCANNOTSCAN

PDF JavaScript calls syncAnnotScan() — a no-op annotation-enumeration primitive used by exploit-kit JavaScript to stage payload reads from annotation /Subject fields before eval(). Not a vulnerable sink itself; rarely seen in legitimate PDFs. (matched in decompressed stream)
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`javascript_obj0007_000.js` `eb39e2de4dbbc100de6d3e30aa43ff78fa075618862ba1ebba5151ea3a3b848d`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 7 at offset 0x19D	273 bytes
`annotation_subject_callee_hex_stage_000.js` `49579bbe5cccba1b424d40b804df35ee7ecc8ecba2396a4815fce6541571e231`	deobfuscated-js	annotation-subject callee-key decoded JavaScript at offset 0x14A	5116 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 5 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
`deobfuscated.js` `7256e1c56333b7b8450ed33ee1dd0bd7ee4ef7764f32330c659615808158835a`	deobfuscated-js	PDF JavaScript deobfuscation pass	79717 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).

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