Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e458d885141d12e5…

MALICIOUS

PDF

89.8 KB Created: 2021-06-06 03:49:56 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-27
MD5: fcd0ae8e3fc5b51eb3001a994375529d SHA-1: 647032eed1bcc4e323d5577e4c69c5f664b72124 SHA-256: e458d885141d12e512bb507d391b932191a0b2617ef48486f713494c33c0a0e1
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains numerous external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm or SEO manipulation tactic. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly indicate malicious intent, likely related to phishing or malware distribution. While no scripts were extracted, the PDF structure and embedded URLs point towards an attempt to redirect users to potentially harmful content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9993

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://nomylo.ru/pbw?utm_term=effect+of+sucrose+concentration+on+yeast+fermentation PDF link annotation
    • https://xofudafitigo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135327781/9248267.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vipeketiduwe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131636725/bca7c052bf7a526.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4383692/normal_6043e1eec3fb1.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lakubamovoto.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776542/9508423.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nabinavupofi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135350319/7727818.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pimusaxasoj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856122/9686284.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://korudodigujoko.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740169/a62a0.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4465393/normal_5fd17ea49a70b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vosokujegenukof.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134474729/fa8277.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4472186/normal_5fe799d837f64.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://biditeso.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134339176/xijijel.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4382003/normal_600915517e068.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gudufiwojofen.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134703846/pobidopigar_mifofido_digosafate_tasijitaradabib.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vatewiwep.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134482367/favexugafisixabejaja.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/6e10f9ae-139a-40e6-91ef-51dfeabe23f0/japajibaropegulapunitivuw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/d73f961d-1570-40ff-a2ab-ee02155f5811/ethical_hacker_definition_computer.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/ee69b4ea-6b71-4821-a2e9-8de82b093216/2013_jeep_grand_cherokee_laredo_common_problems.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/daaaebf7-ddc8-438d-808d-5d818433e0e0/16008953503.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/ae03514b-4e89-4544-baf9-aabecaed6404/wamujiforufoxatibu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/1ce53685-2221-4fc4-b5aa-61199f2433ea/39444851164.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/d775b271-fdfc-4e9a-ac36-9d53ca66a344/what_is_solution_in_science_class_9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/2928b454-c608-492f-a7a7-a92a4ca7fef1/everstart_1200_peak_amp_jump_starter_charging_cord.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/3708aae1-1381-4b8b-8699-461ceea70494/36241677326.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000120a3.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x120A3 5052 bytes
SHA-256: 3de9992379afc84c9cac9112a5db8b4722041d7419f22d22fd732b91d9b5c8f0
font_01_sfnt_off000131d1.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x131D1 11516 bytes
SHA-256: d320b86135a0a63d703a7b5908c9007e5e77e8fb2b0666a0a91657a6ecb66821