Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e44c1ac5c56df38f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

74.3 KB Created: 2021-04-06 01:24:17 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: e95e1756062536079e6bfec4d631e53c SHA-1: 792219de4e6bb3c02fe74a2755be46ba96b780c0 SHA-256: e44c1ac5c56df38f3cbb23a0e1336c8923efdfc19a7131ce02d5eb4dada554bf
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF document contains a large number of external links, many of which point to benign-looking PDF files, but one prominent URL leads to a suspicious domain. The ML classifier strongly indicated maliciousness, and the heuristic firings suggest this is part of a link farm designed to obscure malicious intent. No scripts were extracted, but the overall structure and URL distribution point towards a phishing or redirection attempt.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 4

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://vilenefex.ru/strik?utm_term=eaton+fuller+manual+transmission+won%2527t+go+into+gear
    • https://lupemofuxuxutuj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383332/2161064.pdf
    • https://nefarixuk.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407944/defebefofixuludej.pdf
    • https://tamoniwezetiro.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/9/135961995/wefanomiluwona_bekaxuxisidido.pdf
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/pojuzijix/183PORu/osu_information_warehouse.pdf
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/letarezetap/Goge6ib/lean_bulk_workout_plan.pdf
    • https://mulodetudujidof.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135325190/netuzo_jozikawapisew_xizifiwokabe.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/4c3c50d7-997b-4194-bba2-7cce8ce6413e/a_short_history_of_the_movies_by_mast_and_kawin.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/ab6bac14-2a8f-4ec1-b404-8c72347d974f/16290574998.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/suxiweke/nevok.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jinotugiwomo/burukituzizemop.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/petikamov/lukijuvawakituvora.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/xukonakefules/voice_chat_games_android.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/362e3522-800a-4f9e-be9f-0891824b4a5c/bobaruzam.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/gorajikunobixi/pizevewiwimibo.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/2a8d4c7f-8a37-401d-ba95-46bd2a591e65/bosch_glm_150c_review.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/f8bcc597-ed70-41ac-80c7-e3aefa1c4ada/pavuxupefupezi.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/a5082bf6-cfff-4569-9e7f-4d39b7283131/kuxutu.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zurovajij/kinuzufulesopiv.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/06dbb393-d9c3-4f93-9aa2-68d9a024f368/jogizanegim.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e838.bin
e8495097282c3160d89023e740615ff6e9104b662659ebffdb6755449fcd16fe		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE838 5168 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000f9d5.bin
4873fdc5d971069bf3a051cc3d686f1a372793875a231d69c708c23ec5362f90		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF9D5 9908 bytes

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