Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e43d683543541287…

MALICIOUS

PDF

26.2 KB Created: 2011-04-18 15:20:20 +08:00
MD5: 589ea3ffd1a0e4be6bbcea4c7ca06b96 SHA-1: 6c2fb318cdaeb16e3885b83a0e75a08d735ae78d SHA-256: e43d68354354128712c24c8c13674901b143a1d1c7781292d51245d48d64c6a8
112 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File

The PDF file contains embedded Flash content that exploits CVE-2011-0611. This vulnerability allows for the execution of arbitrary code, indicating a malicious intent to compromise the user's system. The embedded file and rich media heuristics confirm the presence of exploitable Flash content. The SHA256 hash is provided as a primary indicator.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier clean score 0.0004

Heuristics 5

  • Adobe Flash Player RichMedia exploit critical CVE likely CVE_2011_0611_FLASH_RICHMEDIA
    PDF combines RichMedia Flash activation with an embedded AS3 SWF loader (ByteArray/loadBytes) and shellcode heap-spray staging. This is the static exploit shape associated with CVE-2011-0611 Flash content delivered through Adobe Reader.
  • RichMedia (Flash) high PDF_RICHMEDIA
    PDF contains /RichMedia (Adobe Flash) which is a historic exploit vector (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload (matched inside decoded stream)
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 1 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objstm_0026_00.bin
0841ed6ca2149b386133777ff3868f6222ba5033d6f52cd654a117610818bd40
pdf-objstm-decoded PDF /ObjStm 26 0 obj (inflated) 1084 bytes